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[S]uch phrases as 'self-government,' and 'the power of the people
over themselves,' do not express the true state of the case. The
'people' who exercise the power, are not always the same people
with those over whom it is exercised; and the 'self-government'
spoken of, is not the government of each by himself, but of each by
all the rest. The will of the people, moreover, practically means,
the will of the most numerous or the most active part of the people;
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the majority, or those who succeed in making themselves accepted
as the majority: the people, consequently, may desire to oppress a
part of their number; and precautions are as much needed against
this, as against any other abuse of power.'
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Ritual
A man stands outside a dimly lit, strangely, yet extravagantly
adorned room. He is wearing a white robe, a white cap, and a neck-
lace of multi-colored beads. Some are purple; some are yellow; some
are white. Splitting half a coconut into four pieces, he begins chant-
ing. The man drops the coconut pieces behind his head onto the grass
and they land with the white coconut meat face up. Babalu Aye is
pleased-the ritual continues.
The man, a priest, enters his apartment. An altar draped in red
cloth stands prominently before an array of religious figurines, rusty
metal cauldrons, candles, cups, fruits, tree branches, and ornamental
chickens. The pots are filled with a mixture of water, wine, alcohol,
coconut milk, dried fish, peppercorns, honey, and chicken blood. The
priest takes a hand-carved ebony knife from the altar and begins tap-
ping the side of one of the pots. He starts to chant. Shortly thereaf-
ter, he dips a cup fashioned from a coconut into the mixture and
drinks the liquid. The priest bathes the figurines and ornamental
chickens in the liquid as the chanting continues.
Another man brings the first live chicken into the apartment. He
brushes it across the priest's chest and back. Still another man places
the bird upon the altar and holds down its feet. The chicken, over-
come by fear, begins to struggle vainly. Raising the bird's head, the
priest begins to pluck its feathers, sprinkling them haphazardly over
the pots and the altar. He bows silently before the altar, praying to
Babalu Aye. Taking the knife from one of the cauldrons, the priest
slits the chicken's throat, severing the carotid arteries. A short stream
of blood shoots from the laceration, and the bird dies.
The priest and his assistant drip blood over the objects adorning
the altar. They then decapitate the chicken and place its head on a
pot. One of the men bites into the breast bone of the bird's now head-
less body and rips the animal open with his teeth. He stuffs the open
chest of the chicken with various herbs, tobacco, and bits of dried fish.
After bathing the carcass in liquid from one of the cauldrons, he
wraps it in a brown paper bag and places it outside the apartment.
1. J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 12 (2d ed. 1859).
1062
MAJORITARIANISM AND FREE EXERCISE
Later, the carcass will be buried near a cemetery. The ceremony is
repeated with two more chickens, two roosters, a pigeon and a small
goat. Finally, the priest informs the participants that the ceremonies
have ended-Babalu Aye is pleased.2
B. The Problem in Context
"Religious freedom is guaranteed everywhere throughout the
United States . . " The first amendment of the United States Con-
stitution provides, in relevant part, that "Congress shall make no law
... prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]." '  The objective of the
free exercise clause is to preserve individual freedom in the choice and
manner of religious worship from the overbearing influence of govern-
ment. "[A]n individual's free exercise of religion is a preferred con-
stitutional activity."' 6 A preference for free exercise, however, does
2. The story is a general description of a Santeria ritual loosely based on Chavez,
Santeria: A Cult of Sacrifice, UPI, Oct. 11, 1981, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni
File, and, to a lesser degree, on Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 723 F.
Supp. 1469 (S.D. Fla. 1989). Babalu-Aye, a Santeria god, is the patron of the sick. Chavez,
supra. St. Lazarus is the Christian symbol for this god. Id. Since Santeria is primarily an
underground religion practiced in individual homes by small groups unconnected to each
other, individual rituals may differ.
3. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162 (1878).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The free exercise clause is applicable to the states by
incorporation into the fourteenth amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303
(1940).
5. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1963) (noting that the
free exercise clause "withdraws from legislative power, state and federal, the exertion of any
restraint on the free exercise of religion" and that "[i]ts purpose is to secure religious liberty in
the individual by prohibiting any invasions thereof by civil authority").
6. Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1612 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
judgment); see also Marcus, The Forum of Conscience: Applying Standards Under the Free
Exercise Clause, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1217, 1218 (indicating that first amendment freedom of
religion "occupies a 'preferred position' in the constitutional hierarchy of protected rights").
Marcus notes that the concept emerged from footnote four of Justice Stone's opinion in United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Marcus, supra, at 1218 n.5. The
footnote provides:
There may be a narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which
are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those
political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of
undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under
the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types
of legislation ....
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of
statutes directed at particular religious, or national, or racial minorities: whether
prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition,
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
1991] 1063
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not make that first amendment right absolute.7
In protecting both the choice and manner of religious worship,
the free exercise clause recognizes two critical components of religious
activity: religious belief and religious conduct.' When governmental
regulation of religious belief is involved, the protections afforded by
the first amendment are absolute.9 The government may not, for
example, compel affirmation of religious belief1 or punish the expres-
sion of religious doctrines it does not favor.' t "The free exercise
clause was at the very least designed to guarantee freedom of con-
science by preventing any degree of compulsion in matters of
belief."12
"The freedom to act, unlike the freedom to believe, cannot be
absolute."' 3 When governmental regulations impinge upon religious
conduct, courts extend only qualified protection.14 The government
must justify any regulation which substantially burdens religious con-
duct "by a compelling state interest and by means narrowly tailored
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4 (citations omitted).
7. See Marcus, supra note 6, at 1230.
8. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
9. See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978) ("The Free Exercise Clause
categorically prohibits government from regulating, prohibiting, or rewarding religious beliefs
as such."); Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969) ("[T]he [First]
Amendment ... commands civil courts to decide church property disputes without resolving
underlying controversies over religious doctrine."); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402
(1963) ("The door of the Free Exercise Clause stands tightly closed against any governmental
regulation of religious beliefs as such."); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944)
("Men may believe what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of their
religious doctrines or beliefs."); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) ("Freedom
of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the
individual may choose cannot be restricted by law."); see also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-6, at 1183 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that the Supreme Court has
often indicated that the constitutional protection of religious belief is absolute).
10. Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 496 (1961) (invalidating under the first amendment
a Maryland constitutional provision requiring a declaration of belief in the existence of God as
a test for office).
11. See Ballard, 322 U.S. at 86 (holding that a jury may not consider the truth or falsity of
an individual's religious beliefs or doctrines in federal mail fraud prosecution).
12. L. TRIBE, supra note 9, § 14-3, at 1160.
13. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1608 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment); see also Reynolds, 98
U.S. at 163 ("it is time enough for the rightful purposes of civil government for its officers to
interfere when principles break out into overt acts against peace and good order") (quoting An
Act for Establishing Religious Freedom, ch. XXXIV (1786), in 12 HENING'S STATUTES AT
LARGE 84, 85 (1823)).
14. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); see also L. TRIBE, supra note 9, § 14-6, at
1183 (stating that the Supreme Court has often indicated that qualified protection is extended
where regulations impinge upon religious actions).
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to achieve that interest."' 5 Courts apply a strict scrutiny standard to
free exercise claims involving religious conduct because "belief and
action cannot be neatly confined in logic-tight compartments."
1 6
Often, however, a clash arises between the rights sought to be pro-
tected by application of the strict scrutiny standard and governmental
promulgation of generally applicable regulations prohibiting conduct
that happens to be an act of worship for an individual or particular
group. This clash of interests came to the fore in Employment Divi-
sion v. Smith 17 and in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of
Hialeah.'
8
1. EMPLOYMENT DIVISION v. SMITH
A private drug rehabilitation organization fired two counselors,
both members of the Native American Church, for ingesting peyote, a
hallucinogenic drug that was used for sacramental purposes during a
church ceremony. 9 The Employment Appeals Board of Oregon
denied the counselors' applications for unemployment compensation
20
under a state law disqualifying employees fired for work-related mis-
conduct. 2' The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the
denial of benefits to persons discharged for engaging in religious acts
constituted an impermissible burden upon the right of free exercise of
religion in violation of the first amendment.22 The Oregon Supreme
Court affirmed, dismissing as constitutionally irrelevant the state's
argument that the denial of unemployment benefits is permissible
because peyote consumption is a crime.23
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.24 Upon
15. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1608 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment); see also Hernandez
v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (i981); Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398.
16. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220.
17. 75 Or. App. 764, 709 P.2d 246 (1985), aff'd as modified, 301 Or. 209, 721 P.2d 445
(1986), vacated, 485 U.S. 660 (1988), reaff'd, 307 Or. 68, 763 P.2d 146 (1988), rev'd, 110 S. Ct.
1595 (1990), reh'g denied, 110 S. Ct. 2604 (1990), acq. in result, 310 Or. 376, 799 P.2d 148
(1990).
18. 723 F. Supp. 1467 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
19. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1597-98.
20. Smith, 301 Or. 209, 211, 721 P.2d 445, 446 (1986).
21. Id. at 21, 721 P.2d at 448. For the text of the state law, see infra note 187.
22. 75 Or. App. 764, 709 P.2d 246 (1985) (per curiam) (reversing and remanding the case
for reconsideration in light of its decision in Black v. Employment Div., 75 Or. App. 735, 707
P.2d 1274 (1985) (holding that the denial of unemployment benefits to a claimant for his
ingestion of peyote at a religious ritual did not serve a compelling state interest by the least
restrictive means and, therefore, violated the free exercise clause)).
23. 301 Or. 209, 218-19, 721 P.2d 445, 450 (1986); see also infra note 185 (describing
Oregon's laws against peyote consumption).
24. 480 U.S. 916 (1987).
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review, the Court found the illegality of peyote consumption constitu-
tionally relevant, indicating that if a state may prohibit certain relig-
iously motivated conduct through criminal laws which do not offend
the first amendment, it may impose a lesser burden, such as the denial
of unemployment compensation benefits, on persons who engage in
criminal conduct.25 Due to the uncertainty regarding the legality of
the religious use of peyote in the State, the Supreme Court vacated the
judgment of the Oregon Supreme Court and remanded the case for a
determination on that issue.2
6
On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court found that the state's
criminal prohibition of peyote use extends to sacramental as well as
recreational use of the drug. 27 It held, however, that such a restric-
tion violated the free exercise clause of the first amendment. 28 The
United States Supreme Court again granted certiorari29 and reversed,
holding that a denial of unemployment compensation benefits result-
ing from the ingestion of peyote, in violation of an otherwise constitu-
tionally valid state prohibition against such use of the drug, does not
constitute an impermissible burden on the right of free exercise of
religion.30
2. CHURCH OF THE LUKUMI BABALU AYE v CITY OF HIALEAH
A religious group brought suit against the City of Hialeah, alleg-
ing, in part, that city ordinances regulating the ritual sacrifice of ani-
mals violated the free exercise clause of the first amendment. 3' The
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye and its members practice Yoruba,
commonly known as Santeria, an ancient African religion in which
the sacrifice of chickens, pigeons, doves, ducks, guinea fowl, goats,
sheep, and turtles is an integral part of religious observance.
3 2
In an effort to bring the practice of this religion into the open,33
the Church occupied land in Hialeah and began to take the steps nec-
25. 485 U.S. 660, 670 (1988). Referring to Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879),
the Court noted that "if a bigamist may be sent to jail despite the religious motivation for his
misconduct, surely a State may refuse to pay unemployment compensation to a marriage
counselor who was discharged because he or she entered into a bigamous relationship." Smith,
485 U.S. at 671.
26. Smith, 485 U.S. at 673-74.
27. 307 Or. 68, 72-73, 763 P.2d 146, 148 (1988).
28. Id. at 76, 763 P.2d at 150.
29. 489 U.S. 1077 (1989).
30. 110 S. Ct. at 1606.
31. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1467, 1469 (S.D.
Fla. 1989).
32. Id. at 1471; see infra notes 234-36 and accompanying text.
33. See infra note 236.
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essary to allow it to function as an established church.34 Shortly
thereafter, the City adopted four ordinances aimed at restricting the
ritual sacrifice of animals.3 5 The Church filed a suit which sought to
establish "the right of the Church to perform animal sacrifices on
Church premises, and ... the right of Church members to perform
sacrifices in their own homes."' 36 The United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida held that city ordinances restricting
the ritual sacrifice of animals do not impermissibly infringe upon free
exercise rights in violation of the first amendment.37
C. Focus of the Comment
This Comment examines application of the free exercise clause in
cases where governmental regulations restrict conduct motivated by
sincere religious belief. It highlights the genesis of modern free exer-
cise jurisprudence and the established dichotomy between religious
belief and religious conduct. It focuses on Employment Division v.
Smith and its retreat from the judicial standards articulated in Sher-
bert v. Verner,38 which courts have applied in reviewing free exercise
claims involving religiously motivated conduct restricted by govern-
mental regulation. 39 Through Smith and Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, this Comment constructs a permeable
boundary dividing an individual's free exercise rights and a govern-
ment's need to regulate for the health, safety, and welfare of its
citizenry.
This Comment takes the position that "conduct motivated by
sincere religious belief, like the belief itself, must ... be at least pre-
sumptively protected by the Free Exercise Clause."'  It argues that
within the majoritarian construct underlying constitutional jurispru-
dence,41 protection of an individual's free exercise rights can only be
achieved through faithful application of a strict scrutiny standard of
judicial review to all challenges to regulations implicating those
rights. Without a sufficiently compelling interest, government should,
34. Church of the Lukumi, 723 F. Supp. at 1476. The City required the Church to obtain
an occupational license and "provide an original certificate of incorporation from the State of
Florida for the Church." Id. at 1477.
35. Id. For a general description of the ordinances at issue, see infra note 239.
36. Church of the Lukumi, 723 F. Supp. at 1469.
37. Id. at 1488.
38. 374 U.S 398 (1963) (holding that a governmental regulation which burdens religious
conduct must be justified by a compelling state interest which cannot be achieved through less
restrictive means).
39. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
40. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1608 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
41. See infra notes 287-99 and accompanying text.
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therefore, grant exemptions from generally applicable legal duties
which curtail religiously motivated conduct.
The Supreme Court in Smith refused to apply a strict scrutiny
standard of review to the challenged legislation. 42  This Comment
suggests that the Supreme Court decided Smith incorrectly and that
the District Court decided Church of the Lukumi correctly, although
each court held that the governmental restrictions at issue did not
violate the first amendment. This Comment presents Church of the
Lukumi as a vehicle for properly resolving the conflict in Smith and
elucidating one border dividing permissible and impermissible govern-
mental infringements upon an individual's free exercise rights.
II. FREE EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE IN PERSPECTIVE
The establishment and free exercise clauses aim "to promote and
assure the fullest possible scope of religious liberty and tolerance for
all and to nurture the conditions which secure the best hope of attain-
ment of that end."'43 Essentially, the religion clauses tend toward the
ultimate goal of liberty of conscience.' The Supreme Court has rec-
ognized the unique importance of such a liberty to a nation built upon
a proud heritage of diversity and independence.4 5 The full scope of
the liberty established by these clauses has, to some degree, always
been at issue throughout their jurisprudential history.46
A. Reynolds v. United States: Free Exercise and the Dichotomy
Between Belief and Action
Free exercise protections embrace two fundamental religious
concepts: freedom of religious belief and freedom of religious conduct
'or action.47 While the free exercise clause protects religious belief
42. 110 S. Ct. at 1603.
43. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring).
44. See Adams & Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1559,
1598-1604 (1989) (identifying liberty of conscience as the central ideal arising from the early
struggles for religious freedom); see also L. TRIBE, supra note 9, § 14-2, at 1156-57 (indicating
that each of the religion clauses functionally protects the interests sought to be protected by
the other); Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41
U. PITT. L. REV. 673, 677 (1980) (noting that "a central purpose of the [religion clauses] was
to protect religious liberty-to prohibit the coercion of religious practice or conscience, a goal
that remains paramount today").
45. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 214.
46. See L. TRIBE, supra note 9, § 14-2, at 1155-57. Issues regarding the breadth of the
liberty protected by the establishment clause are beyond the scope of this Comment.
47. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
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absolutely,48 religious conduct is not similarly protected.49 Laws that
target a particular religious act solely for its religious aspect would
likely violate the first amendment.50 Secular laws which incidentally
impinge upon religious practices may pass constitutional muster.5
The Supreme Court first recognized the distinction between belief and
action in Reynolds v. United States. 2
As a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints,
commonly known as the Mormon Church, George Reynolds prac-
ticed polygamy.5 3 This practice, a duty of male members of the Mor-
mon Church,54 violated a federal law prohibiting that practice in the
territories of the United States." Reynolds challenged the statute,
and his resulting conviction thereunder, as unconstitutional restric-
tions on his free exercise rights.5 6
Noting the dangers inherent in allowing religious motivations to
excuse positive acts which violate the law, 57 the Supreme Court found
48. See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1599 (1990) ("The free exercise
of religion means, first and foremost, the right to believe and profess whatever religious
doctrine one desires."); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963) (stating that the free
exercise clause prohibits "governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such"); Cantwell, 374
U.S. at 303 (indicating that the freedom to believe is absolute); Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (indicating that laws may not interfere with religious beliefs).
49. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
50. See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1599 (indicating that regulations banning acts or abstentions
solely when performed for religious reasons would be "prohibiting the free exercise [of
religion]").
51. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988); Bowen
v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
52. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
53. Id. at 161.
54. According to the tenets of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, this duty
stemmed from various books, including the Holy Bible, which members of the church believed
to be of divine origin. Id. The members also believed that
the practice of polygamy was directly enjoined upon the male members [of the
church] thereof by the Almighty God, in a revelation to Joseph Smith, the
founder and prophet of [the] church; that failing or refusing to practice polygamy
by [the] male members of [the] church, when circumstances would admit, would
be punished, and that the penalty for such failure and refusal would be
damnation in the life to come.
Id.
55. Id. at 146. The regulation stated:
[E]very person having a husband or wife living, who shall marry any other
person, whether married or single, in a Territory of the United States, or other
place over which the United States have exclusive jurisdiction, shall .. .be
adjudged guilty of bigamy, and ... shall be punished by a fine not exceeding five
hundred dollars, and by imprisonment for a term of not exceeding five years.
12 STAT. 501 (1862) (REV. STAT. § 5352).
56. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 153, 161-67.
57. Id. at 166-67 ("Can a man excuse his practices [contrary to the law] because of his
religious belief? To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief
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the statute at issue constitutional and upheld the conviction."8 In its
holding, the Court explicitly recognized the dichotomy between belief
and action: "Laws are made for the government of actions, and while
they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they
may with practices."59 Under Reynolds, therefore, religiously moti-
vated conduct could be proscribed by secular governmental regula-
tions enacted in pursuit of valid legislative goals.60 One commentator
described the state of free exercise law after Reynolds as follows:
[G]enerally when Congress or a state legislature, in the exercise of
some constitutional power, enacts a statute which requires or pro-
hibits some action, and makes that violation a criminal offense,
there is no requirement inherent in the First Amendment that reli-
gious beliefs shall constitute a sufficient excuse or justification for
noncompliance with the terms of the statute. 61
B. The Rise of Strict Scrutiny Review
The standards established in Reynolds remained essentially
unchanged for almost a century.62 Laws aimed at valid, secular goals
which imposed burdens on religious conduct required no other justifi-
cation for their validity.63 In the early 1960's, however, the Supreme
Court decided two cases which dramatically altered the standards set
forth in Reynolds:6' Braunfeld v. Brown 65 and Sherbert v. Verner.66
1. BRAUNFELD v. BROWN
Abraham Braunfeld, a retail merchant, sold clothing and home
furnishings from a small store located in Philadelphia.67 He was "a
member of the Orthodox Jewish faith, which requires the closing of
superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto
himself.").
58. Id. at 166, 168.
59. Id. at 166.
60. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion,
102 HARV. L. REV. 933, 938 (1989).
61. M. KONVITZ, FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTIES OF A FREE PEOPLE 46 (1957).
62. Lupu, supra note 60, at 939; cf Note, Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion: A
Subjective Alternative, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1258, 1261 (1989) (indicating that the erosion of the
Reynolds standard began in 1940 with the Supreme Court's decision in Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)).
63. Lupu, supra note 60, at 940 ("Under Reynolds, the state was free to create such [state-
erected] impediments [to religious action] as long as its policy served secular goals.").
64. Marcus, supra note 6, at 1220 (noting that the law of free exercise, in the ten years
following Sherbert, "changed remarkably").
65. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
66. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
67. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 601.
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... places of business and a total abstention from all manner of work
from nightfall each Friday until nightfall each Saturday."6 In order
to comply with the tenets of his faith, he closed his store as required
and opened it on Sundays in order to make up for some of the lost
revenues.6 9 In doing so, however, Braunfeld violated a Pennsylvania
criminal statute prohibiting the retail sale of various commodities on
Sundays. v° He challenged the constitutionality of the statute on free
exercise grounds and sought a permanent injunction against its
enforcement.7" Braunfeld asserted that enforcement of the statute
would either compel him to give up observance of his Sabbath or
place him at a serious economic disadvantage.72
Writing for the plurality, Chief Justice Warren recognized the
dichotomy between belief and action established in Reynolds.73 He
distinguished Reynolds, however, by noting that the federal law
prohibiting bigamy made a religious practice of the Mormon Church
illegal.74 The Pennsylvania statute did not make observance of the
Jewish Sabbath unlawful. 7' Thus, enforcement of the statute only
burdened those Orthodox Jews who found it necessary to work on
68. Id.
69. Id at 611 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan noted that Braunfeld did "a
substantial amount of busincss on Sunday" and made up "some, but not all of the business...
lost" by closing on Saturday. Id.
70. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 600. The Pennsylvania criminal statute at issue read, in
pertinent part:
Whoever engages on Sunday in the business of selling, or sells or offers for
sale, on such day, at retail, clothing and wearing apparel, clothing accessories,
furniture, housewares, home, business or office furnishings, household, business
or office appliances, hardware, tools, paints, building and lumber supply
materials, jewelry, silverware, watches, clocks, luggage, musical instruments and
recordings, or toys, excluding novelties and souvenirs, shall, upon conviction
thereof in a summary proceeding for the first offense, be sentenced to pay a fine of
not exceeding one hundred dollars ($100), and for the second or any subsequent
offense committed within one year after conviction for the first offense, be
sentenced to pay a fine of not exceeding two hundred dollars ($200) or undergo
imprisonment not exceeding thirty days in default thereof.
Each separate sale or offer to sell shall constitute a separate offense.
1959 PA. LAWS 660 (codified as amended at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4699.10 (Purdon Supp.
1960)).
71. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 601. The suit included equal protection and establishment
clause claims as well. Id. The Court, however, considered only the free exercise challenges
since it had already disposed of similar equal protection and establishment clause claims in
Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc., v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961). Braunfeld, 366
U.S. at 601.
72. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 602.
73. Id. at 603-04 ("[L]egislative power over mere opinion is forbidden but it may reach
people's actions when they are found to be in violation of important social duties or subversive
of good order, even when the actions are demanded by one's religion.").
74. Id. at 605. For the text of the federal law at issue in Reynolds, see supra note 55.
75. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 605.
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Sunday.76 The plurality found this indirect burden to be markedly
different from the burden imposed by a law forcing an individual to
choose between "abandoning his religious principle or facing criminal
prosecution."' 77 In so distinguishing Reynolds, the plurality recog-
nized the burden concept in the free exercise realm.78
Though upholding the Pennsylvania statute, the plurality raised
the level of judicial scrutiny involved in assessing free exercise chal-
lenges to governmental regulations burdening religious practices.79
If the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observance of one
or all religions or is to discriminate invidiously between religions,
that law is constitutionally invalid even though the burden may be
characterized as being only indirect. But if the State regulates con-
duct by enacting a general law within its power, the purpose and
effect of which is to advance the State's secular goals, the statute is
valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance unless the
State may accomplish its purpose by means which do not impose
such a burden.o
Braunfeld thus broadened the scope of free exercise protection of
religiously motivated conduct in two important ways. First, it recog-
nized indirect burdens on religious conduct as within the ambit of the
clause's concerns.8 Second, it raised the standard by which a court
must review a challenged state regulation. 2 The plurality left to
Sherbert the task of completing the process Braunfeld commenced.
2. SHERBERT. VERNER
Adell Sherbert worked as a spool tender in a South Carolina tex-
tile mill, Monday through Friday from 7:00 a.m. until 3:00 p.m. 3
She was a member of the Seventh Day Adventist Church, which
teaches that a member should perform no work or labor between sun-
down on Friday and sundown on Saturday.84 Her employer notified
her that she would be required to work on Saturdays.85 Refusing to
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See Lupu, supra note 60, at 939-40.
79. Id. at 940.
80. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 607 (emphasis added).
81. Lupu, supra note 60, at 940 ("Although its result seemed inhospitable to free exercise,
Braunfeld ...significantly widened the clause's potential scope by both including indirect
harms to religion and increasing the state's difficulty in satisfying the standard of review.").
82. Lupu, supra note 60, at 940.
83. Sherbert v. Verner, 240 S.C. 286, 125 S.E.2d 737 (1962), aff'd, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
84. Id. at 288-89, 125 S.E.2d at 738.
85. Id. at 288, 125 S.E.2d at 737-38. Prior to that time, the mill allowed Saturday work on
a voluntary basis. Id. at 288, 125 S.E.2d at 738. Sherbert did not work on any Saturday after
becoming a member of the Seventh Day Adventist Church. Id. Apparently, the operations of
1072
MAJORITARIANISM AND FREE EXERCISE
work on her Sabbath day, Sherbert failed to report to the mill on the
next six successive Saturdays. 6 Her employer subsequently dis-
charged her."'
The South Carolina Employment Security Commission denied
Sherbert's claim for unemployment compensation, stating that the
mill discharged her because she was unavailable for work.88 Under
South Carolina law, such a finding precludes an individual from
securing unemployment compensation benefits.89 Sherbert challenged
the law as an unconstitutional violation of her free exercise rights.9°
Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan focused on the same
issues present in Braunfeld: the burden on religious practice and the
governmental interest at stake. 9' First, the Court decided that the
denial of benefits imposed a burden upon Sherbert's free exercise of
religion.92 Comparing the burden resulting from the denial of benefits
to a fine imposed against Sherbert for her Saturday worship, the
Court described the burden as forcing her to "choose between follow-
practically all textile plants in the area included six-day work schedules. Id. at.289, 125 S.E.2d
at 738. Such a situation resulted in the unavailability of other suitable work for Sherbert. Id.
86. Id. at 288, 125 S.E.2d at 738.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 289, 125 S.E.2d at 738.
89. Id. at 290-91, 125 S.E.2d at 739. The 1952 Code of Laws of South Carolina, provided,
in pertinent part:
Section 68-113. An unemployed insured worker shall be eligible to receive
benefits with respect to any week only if the Commission finds that:
(1) He has made a claim for benefits with respect to such week in
accordance with such regulations as the Commission may prescribe;
(2) He has registered for work...
(3) He is able to work and is available for work ....
1955 S.C. Acts 488.
Section 68-114. Any insured worker shall be ineligible for benefits:
(1) 'Leaving work voluntarily.' If the Commission finds that he has left
voluntarily without good cause his most recent work prior to filing a request
for determination of insured status...
(2) 'Discharge for misconduct.' If the Commission finds that he has been
discharged for misconduct connected with his most recent work prior to filing
a request for determination of insured status or a request for initiation of a
claim series within an established benefit year ...
(3) 'Failure to accept work.' If the Commission finds that he has failed,
without good cause, (a) either to apply for available suitable work, when so
directed by the employment office or the Commission, (b) to accept available
suitable work when offered him by the employment office or the employer ....
(a) In determining whether or not any work is suitable for an individual,
the Commission shall consider the degree of risk involved to his health, safety
and morals ....
1955 S.C. Acts 489-90.
90. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 401.
91. Id. at 403; see supra text accompanying notes 80-82.
92. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
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ing the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one
hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to
accept work, on the other hand."93
Second, the Court decided no compelling state interest existed
that would justify the substantial infringement of Sherbert's free exer-
cise rights.94 Although the Court found that Pennsylvania established
a strong interest in providing a uniform day of rest from labor in
Braunfeld,95 South Carolina advanced no interest of this magnitude.96
Under such circumstances, the Court held that states may not consti-
tutionally apply the eligibility provisions for unemployment compen-
sation benefits so as to force a worker to abandon religious
convictions.
97
In phrasing the inquiry in terms of compelling state interests, the
Court raised the standard of review in free exercise challenges to gov-
ernmental regulations, as established in Braunfeld, to a strict scrutiny
level. 98 Significantly, the Court indicated that even if the state
asserted a compelling interest, it would still have to "demonstrate that
no alternative forms of regulation would combat such abuses without
infringing First Amendment rights." 99 Thus, after Sherbert, a govern-
mental regulation that imposed a burden upon religiously motivated
conduct had to be justified by a compelling state interest that could
not be achieved through less restrictive means."°°
93. Id. at 404.
94. Id. at 407-09.
95. 366 U.S. at 607.
96. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407. South Carolina argued primarily that providing a religious
exemption to Sherbert and others raised the specter of fraudulent claims for unemployment
compensation benefits. Id.; see also Marcus, supra note 6, at 1225.
97. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 410.
98. Id. at 406 ("It is basic that no showing merely of a rational relationship to some
colorable state interest would suffice"). The Supreme Court previously described strict
scrutiny analysis as follows:
[E]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that
purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal
liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative
abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the
same basic purpose.
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). Justice Powell noted, in a 1982 lecture, that most
commentators recognize footnote four from United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S.
144, 152 n.4 (1938), "as a primary source of strict scrutiny judicial review." Powell, Carolene
Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1087, 1088 (1982). For the text of the footnote, see
supra note 6.
99. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407.
100. See Lupu, supra note 60, at 934. The test developed by the Supreme Court can be
divided into three prongs:
1. Does the governmental regulation result in a burden upon the free exercise of
the claimant's religion?
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C. Development of the Sherbert Standard
Although the Braunfeld and Sherbert decisions established the
standard applicable in challenges to governmental regulations impli-
cating free exercise rights, they did little to clarify the operation of the
standard.' 0  Two decisions, Wisconsin v. Yoder ' 0 2 and United States
v. Lee,'°3 highlight the development of Sherbert and the application of
the strict scrutiny standard in free exercise cases. Lee also marks the
Court's weakening of the ends and means components of strict scru-
tiny analysis, a significant doctrinal change in free exercise
jurisprudence. l"
1. WISCONSIN . YODER
Jonas Yoder, a member of the Old Order Amish religion, lived in
Green County, Wisconsin. 10 5 According to the tenets of his faith, a
child's attendance at high school endangers the salvation of both the
child and his parents and exposes the entire family to church cen-
sure.'1 6 Accordingly, he refused to send his fifteen year-old daughter
to high school after she completed the eighth grade. 107 Convicted of
violating Wisconsin's compulsory school-attendance law,' 08 he chal-
2. Does the regulation serve a compelling interest?
3. Does the regulation serve that interest through the use of the least restrictive
means available?
Note, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association: A Form-Over-Effect Stan-
dard for the Free Exercise Clause, 20 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 171, 172-73 (1988).
101. See Lupu, supra note 60, at 942.
102. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
103. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
104. See L. TRIBE, supra note 9, § 14-13, at 1260-62 ("Lee seems to weaken both aspects of
the required state showing.").
105. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972).
106. Id. at 209. The Amish do not objectto formal education through the first eight grades.
Id. at 212. "They view such a basic education as acceptable because it does not significantly
expose their children to worldly values or interfere with their development in the Amish
community during the crucial adolescent period." Id. Formal high school education,
however,
is contrary to Amish beliefs, not only because it places Amish children in an
environment hostile to Amish beliefs with increasing emphasis on competition in
class work and sports and with pressure to conform to the styles, manners, and
ways of the peer group, but also because it takes them away from their
community, physically and emotionally, during the crucial and formative
adolescent period of life.
Id. at 211.
107. Id. at 207.
108. Id. The statute provided:
(l)(a) Unless the child has a legal excuse or has graduated from high school, any
person having under his control a child who is between the ages of 7 and 16 years
shall cause such child to attend school regularly during the full period and hours,
religious holidays excepted, that the public or private school in which such child
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lenged the statute and his conviction on free exercise grounds.'19
The Supreme Court, applying the Sherbert standard, affirmed the
Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision overturning the criminal convic-
tion." Chief Justice Burger described the burden placed upon
Yoder's religious practices as severe and inescapable, indicating that
the "law affirmatively compel[led him], under threat of criminal sanc-
tion, to perform acts undeniably at odds with fundamental tenets of
[his] religious beliefs."1' The Court, therefore, focused primarily on
the effect of the law on religion, not the governmental action in ques-
tion." 2 Further, although finding the state's interest in compulsory
education "admittedly strong," the Court held that the state's interest
did not rise to a level sufficient to outweigh Yoder's interest in the free
exercise of his religion. 3
The Court's balancing of the sufficiency of Wisconsin's interests
against Yoder's free exercise rights exemplified the level of scrutiny
mandated by Sherbert.
Where fundamental claims of religious freedom are at stake, how-
ever, we cannot accept such a sweeping claim; despite its admitted
validity in the generality of cases, we must searchingly examine the
interests that the State seeks to promote by its requirement for
should be enrolled is in session until the end of the school term, quarter or
semester of the school year in which he becomes 16 years of age...
(5) Whoever violates this section ... may be fined not less than $5 nor more than
$50 or imprisoned not more than 3 months or both.
WIs. STAT. § 118.15(1), (5) (1969). The statute granted exemptions for good cause, as deter-
mined by the school board of the child's district of residence, for a physical or mental condi-
tion making attendance inappropriate, or for completion of the full four-year high school
course. WIs. STAT. § 118.15(3) (1969). Wisconsin law allowed for substitute instruction, as
approved by the state superintendent, at a location other than a school, provided that the
instruction substituted was substantially equivalent to that given to children attending school
in the child's district of residence. WIs. STAT. § 118.15(4) (1969).
109. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207.
110. Id. at 234.
111. Id. at 218. The Chief Justice noted that the statute "carrie[d] with it precisely the kind
of objective danger to the free exercise of religion that the First Amendment was designed to
prevent" because the Amish "must either abandon belief and be assimilated into society at
large, or be forced to migrate to some other and more tolerant region." Id.
112. See Note, supra note 100, at 185 (observing that the Court in Yoder "did not
specifically address the question of whether a non-coercive government action which has an
impact on free exercise is unconstitutional" but stating that the language of the opinion
demonstrates the Court's concern with the regulation's impact rather than its form).
113. Id. at 235-36. The Court observed that the Amish
convincingly demonstrated the sincerity of their religious beliefs, the
interrelationship of belief with their mode of life, the vital role that belief and
daily conduct play in the continued survival of Old Order Amish communities
and their religious organization, and the hazards presented by the State's
enforcement of a statute generally valid as to others.
Id. at 235.
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compulsory education to age 16, and the impediment to those
objectives that would flow from recognizing the claimed Amish
exemption. 114
The Court also expressed some hostility regarding categorization
of religious claims under the dichotomy between belief and action,
stating that "belief and action cannot be neatly confined in logic-tight
compartments."" ' 5 Chief Justice Burger maintained that the Court
had rejected the idea that religiously motivated conduct is always
outside the scope of free exercise protections." 6 Significantly, the
Court noted that "there are areas of conduct protected by the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and thus beyond the power
of the State to control, even under regulations of general
applicability."I 17
2. UNITED STATES v. LEE
Edwin Lee, a farmer and carpenter, "failed to file the quarterly
social security tax returns required for employers, withhold social
security tax from his employees, or pay the employer's share of social
security taxes" during the years 1970 to 1977."1 The Internal Reve-
nue Service assessed employment taxes in excess of $27,000 in
1978.19 After remitting $91, representing payment for the taxes for
the first quarter of 1973,120 Lee filed for a refund.12" ' Upon denial of
his claim, he sued the United States, seeking declaratory and injunc-
tive relief from payment of the tax, and alleging that payment of the
tax was a violation of his free exercise rights. 22 Lee and his employ-
ees were members of the Old Order Amish religion.'23 According to
his faith, it was sinful to accept social security benefits or contribute to
the social security system.' 24
114. Id. at 221.
115. Id. at 220.
116. Id. at 219-20.
117. Id. at 220. "A regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend
the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free
exercise of religion." Id.
118. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 254 (1982).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 254-55. The lower court's opinion indicates that the $91 payment represented
"the assessment for the first quarter of 1977." Lee v. United States Gov't, 497 F. Supp. 180,
181 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
121. Lee, 497 F. Supp. at 181.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 181-82. Lee indicated that "it is a sin to fail to provide for or to allow another to
provide for your own people." Id. at 181. His belief stemmed from a biblical passage: "But if
any provide not ... for those of his own house, he hath denied the faith and is worse than an
infidel." Id. (quoting I Timothy 5:8).
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After determining that Lee did not qualify for a statutory exemp-
tion,' 25 the Court turned to the existence of a constitutionally
required exemption. 26 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger
first assessed the burden imposed by the regulations at issue.'27 Not-
ing that payment or receipt of social security benefits violates Amish
religious beliefs, the Court found that "compulsory participation in
the social security system" constituted a burden upon Lee's free exer-
cise rights. 2 ' The Chief Justice also noted, however, that "the Gov-
ernment's interest in assuring mandatory and continuous
participation in and contribution to the social security system [was]
very high."' 29
Finally, the Court addressed accommodation of the Amish
beliefs. 130 Chief Justice Burger phrased the issue as "whether accom-
modating the Amish belief will unduly interfere with fulfillment of the
governmental interest."131 Applying this standard, the Court held
that because the governmental interest was very high and granting an
exemption would serve as a functional impediment to the sound oper-
ation of the tax system, the Constitution did not compel the granting
of a religious exemption from the challenged regulations.'32
Lee represents a doctrinal shift away from Sherbert and its prog-
eny. 3 3 The decision seemed to broaden the first prong of Sherbert,
the compelling interest requirement, by allowing the state to advance
more generalized interests, rather than the narrowly defined interests
125. Lee, 455 U.S. at 256. The statutory exemption provided:
Any individual may file an application ... for an exemption from the tax
imposed by this chapter if he is a member of a recognized religious sect or
division thereof and is an adherent of established tenets or teachings of such sect
or division by reason of which he is conscientiously opposed to acceptance of the
benefits of any private or public insurance which makes payments in the event of
death, disability, old-age, or retirement or makes payments toward the cost of, or
provides services for, medical care (including the benefits of any insurance system
established by the Social Security Act).
26 U.S.C. § 1402(g) (1982). The Court noted that Lee did not qualify for the exemption
because he was not a self-employed individual. 455 U.S. at 256 n.5.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 256-57.
128. Id. at 257. The Chief Justice indicated that because "[i]t is not within 'the judicial
function and judicial competence' . . . to determine whether appellee or the Government has
the proper interpretation of the Amish faith," the Court accepted "appellee's contention that
both payment and receipt of social security benefits [was] forbidden by the Amish faith." Id.
(quoting Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981)).
129. Id. at 258-59. The Court noted that the size and design of the social security system
mandated compulsory participation by employers and employees. Id. at 258.
130. Id. at 259-61.
131. Id. at 259 (emphasis added).
132. Id. at 260.
133. See L. TRIBE, supra note 9, § 14-13, at 1260.
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previously required.134 Lee also seems to lower the means analysis
required from a "least restrictive alternative" standard to an "unduly
interfere" standard.135 As courts have subsequently noted, the
"unduly interfere" standard is looser than a "closely tailored" or
"least restrictive alternative" standard.'36
D. Narrowing the Burden Concept
The dramatic increase in the level of scrutiny applied to free
exercise claims in the Sherbert line of cases expanded the scope of
religious practices deemed protected.1 37 Recently, a new vision of the
free exercise clause has led the Court to significantly restrict its recog-
nition of legally cognizable burdens, thereby reducing the protections
afforded by the clause. 138 Two cases, Bowen v. Roy' 39 and Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association,1" exemplify this
trend and set the stage for Employment Division v. Smith.
1. BOWENv. ROY
Stephen J. Roy, a member of the Abenaki Indian Tribe, 14 1 sued
to prevent the State of Pennsylvania "from requiring [him] to provide
a social security number for [his] daughter, Little Bird of the Snow, as
a condition for obtaining food stamps and welfare benefits.' 142
According to his religious beliefs, governmental use of such a number
would rob his daughter of her spirit.1 43  Roy instituted an action
134. Id. at 1261. In Lee, the interest advanced by the United States involved "assuring
mandatory and continuous participation" in the social security system as a whole. Lee, 455
U.S. at 259; see also L. TRIBE, supra note 9, § 14-13, at 1261.
135. L. TRIBE, supra note 9, § 14-13, at 1261.
136. See infra note 256 and accompanying text.
137. Lupu, supra note 60, at 937.
138. Id. The Supreme Court developed a two-prong test to aid in determining when a
governmental action burdens religious conduct. See Casenote, 20 ST. MARY's L.J. 427, 432-33
(1989). Under the first prong of the test, established in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-
06 (1963), the claimant must show that the governmental action penalized his religious
practices or compelled him to perform acts which violate his religious beliefs. The Court
established the second prong in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 208, 215-16 (1972), which
required a claimant to prove that his beliefs are sincere, rise from a deep religious conviction,
and are shared by an organized group.
139. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
140. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
141. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 696.
142. Id. at 712 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part). The requirements of the Aid to Families
with Dependent Children Program and the Food Stamp Program direct state agencies to
require, as a condition of eligibility for participation in the programs in question, that each aid
recipient furnish his or her social security number to the appropriate state agencies. The
regulations instruct state agencies to use social security numbers in the administration of the
programs. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(25) (1982); 7 U.S.C. § 2025(e) (1982).
143. Id. at 696. Roy testified to his belief that
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against the State of Pennsylvania seeking an exemption, on free exer-
cise grounds, from the Social Security number requirement.'"
The Court rejected Roy's claim, stating that "[t]he Free Exercise
Clause cannot be understood to require the Government to conduct
its own internal affairs in ways that comport with the religious beliefs
of particular citizens." '45 Chief Justice Burger noted that the statu-
tory requirement did not, by threat of sanctions, affirmatively compel
individuals to refrain from religiously motivated conduct. 46 Charac-
terizing the requirement as neutral and uniformly applicable, the plu-
rality found the regulations distinguishable from the regulations at
issue in Sherbert. 147
The Chief Justice refused to apply a strict scrutiny analysis, opt-
ing instead for a less rigid and exacting standard.1 4
Absent proof of an intent to discriminate against particular reli-
gious beliefs or against religion in general, the Government meets
its burden when it demonstrates that a challenged requirement for
governmental benefits, neutral and uniform in its application, is a
reasonable means of promoting a legitimate public interest., 49
The plurality described the governmental interest in preventing fraud
as both legitimate and important. 50  It also found the regulatory
requirement to be "a reasonable means of promoting that goal.' 51
Significantly, the plurality held that although the state may choose, as
a matter of legislative policy, to grant an exemption upon religious
grounds, refusal to do so does not violate the free exercise clause.1
52
technology [was] 'robbing the spirit of man.' In order to prepare his daughter for
greater spiritual power, therefore, [he] testified ... that he must keep her person
and spirit unique and that the uniqueness of the Social Security number as an
identifier, coupled with the other uses of the number over which she has no
control, [would] serve to 'rob the spirit' of his daughter and prevent her from
attaining greater spiritual power.
Id.
144. Id. at 695.
145. Id. at 699. The Court held that the statute requiring a state agency to utilize Social
Security numbers in administering the programs at issue does not violate the First
Amendment. Id. at 701.
146. Id. at 703 (plurality opinion).
147. Id. at 708.
148. Id. at 707 ("The test applied in cases like Wisconsin v. Yoder is not appropriate in this
setting.... The Government should not be put to [that] strict test .... ) (citations omitted).
149. Id. at 707-08.
150. Id. at 709.
151. Id. at 710.
152. Id. at 712 ("[A] legislature might decide to make religious accommodations to a
general and neutral system of awarding benefits, '[b]ut our concern is not with the wisdom of
legislation but with its constitutional limitation.' ") (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S.
599, 608 (1961)).
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In order to reach this conclusion, the Chief Justice found that
although the statutory requirements at issue constituted a burden
upon Roy's religious practice, that impediment could not be charac-
terized as a legally cognizable burden upon his free exercise rights:15 3
"The Free Exercise Clause affords an individual protection from cer-
tain forms of governmental compulsion; it does not afford an individ-
ual the right to dictate the conduct of the Government's internal
procedures."' 54 The regulations forced "a choice between securing a
governmental benefit and adherence to religious beliefs."' 55 These
regulations, the plurality noted, are distinguishable from those which
criminalize religiously motivated conduct or compel an individual to
act contrary to his religious beliefs.156 Since Roy failed to establish
the existence of a legally cognizable burden upon his religious prac-
tices, the protections of the free exercise clause did not reach those
practices and the Court did not have to apply the Sherbert
standard. 5 7
2. LYNG .NORTHWEST INDIAN CEMETERY PROTECTIVE
ASSOCIATION
The Native American faith, rather than rely on doctrines or
creeds as do many western religions, finds its religious impetus in the
use of land itself.'5 8  "For at least 200 years and probably much
longer, the Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa Indians have held sacred an
approximately 25 square-mile area of land situated in what is today
the Blue Creek Unit of Six Rivers National Forest in northwest Cali-
fornia."' '59 In the early 1970's, the United States Forest Service began
preparing a management plan for this area. 16° The primary focus of
the plan involved harvesting trees in the Blue Creek Unit'6 ' and build-
ing a seventy-five mile road linking the towns of Gasquet and Orleans
153. See id. at 701-04; see also Lupu, supra note 60, at 944.
154. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 700.
155. Id. at 706.
156. Id. at 703-05.
157. See id. at 707.
158. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 460-61 (1988)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Native Americans view the land itself as a living being. Id. at 461.
Central to this view of land and its significance in religious ceremonies is its uniqueness. Id.
"For respondent Indians, the most sacred of lands is the high country where, they believe,
prehuman spirits moved with the coming of humans to the earth." Id.
159. Id. at 459. This area, the Chimney Rock section of Six Rivers National Forest, is
known to those tribes as the "high country," an area of critical religious significance. Id. at
442.
160. Id. at 462 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
161. Id. A central aspect of the plan involved "the harvesting of 733 million board feet of
Douglas fir over an 80 year period." Id.
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in California.1 62 The Forest Service planned to construct a six-mile
section of that road through the Chimney Rock area, 63 primarily "to
provide a route for hauling timber harvested under the management
plan."' 64 An Indian organization 65 challenged these portions of the
management plan alleging, in part,-that they violated the free exercise
rights of its members. 66
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor indicated that the
burden placed upon the religious practices at issue was not "heavy
enough to violate the Free Exercise Clause."' 67 She characterized the
claim as indistinguishable from the challenge in Roy, 68 noting that
the governmental actions involved in each case, while interfering with
an individual's ability to practice his or her faith, did not coerce indi-
viduals to violate their religious beliefs or penalize their religious con-
duct.' 69  The Court maintained that "[t]he crucial word in the
constitutional text is 'prohibit' "170 and stated "that indirect coercion
or penalties on the free exercise of religion, not just outright prohibi-
162. Id. at 442. The Forest Service labelled this portion of the project "the G-O road." Id.
163. Id. In order to assess the effects of the plan, the Forest Service prepared a draft
environmental impact statement ("EIS"), issued in 1977, which discussed the proposed road
upgrade. Id. The Forest Service, in response to comments on the draft EIS, "commissioned a
study of American Indian cultural and religious sites in the area." Id. The study, completed
in 1979, identified the areas in question as integral and indispensable in their religious
significance. Id. It concluded that the proposed construction would cause irreparable harm to
these sacred areas and recommended that the Forest Service not undertake construction of the
road. Id. "In 1982, the Forest Service decided not to adopt this recommendation, and it
prepared a final [EIS] for construction of the road." Id. at 443. The government rejected
alternative sites for various reasons, including that the alternative sites would have intruded
upon sacred areas. Id.
164. Id. at 462 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Construction of the road would also "enhance
public access to the Six Rivers and other national forests, and allow for more efficient
maintenance and fire control by the Forest Service itself." Id.
165. In addition to the Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, the original
parties to the suit included the Sierra Club, the Wilderness Society, California Trout, the
Siskiyou Mountains Resource Council, the Redwood Region Audubon Society, and the
Northcoast Environmental Center (non-profit corporations and nature organizations); the
State of California acting through its Native American Heritage Commission; Jimmie James,
Sam Jones, Lowana Branter, and Christopher H. Peters (individuals of American Indian
heritage); and Timothy McKay and John Amadio (individual members of Sierra Club).
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586, 590 (N.D. Cal.),
later proceeding, 589 F. Supp. 921 (N.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 764 F.2d
581 (9th Cir. 1985), on reh'g, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd and remanded sub nom.,
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
166. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 443.
167. Id. at 447.
168. Id. at 449 ("The building of a road or the harvesting of timber on publicly owned land
cannot meaningfully be distinguished from the use of a Social Security number in Roy.").
169. Id. at 450-51.
170. Id. at 451.
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tions, are subject to scrutiny under the First Amendment."' 1 Justice
O'Connor, however, was careful to limit these statements asserting
that
[they do] not and cannot imply that incidental effects of govern-
ment programs, which may make it more difficult to practice cer-
tain religions but which have no tendency to coerce individuals
into acting contrary to their religious beliefs, require government
to bring forward a compelling justification for its otherwise lawful
actions. 172
Citing its inability to determine the truth of religious beliefs, the
Court declared that it could not weigh and compare the adverse
effects of governmental actions in different cases. 73 The location of
the line dividing unconstitutional prohibitions of free exercise from
legitimate governmental conduct of its own affairs "cannot depend on
measuring the effects of a governmental action on a religious objec-
tor's spiritual development."' 174 The Court, therefore, focused on the
form and not the effect of the governmental burden on religious
conduct. 17 5
Finally, Justice O'Connor insisted that government could not
operate efficiently, if at all, if it were forced to satisfy the religious
needs of every citizen. 76
The First Amendment must apply to all citizens alike, and it can
give none of them a veto over public programs that do not prohibit
the free exercise of religion. The Constitution does not, and courts
cannot, offer to reconcile the various competing demands on gov-
ernment, many of them rooted in sincere religious belief, that inevi-
tably arise in so diverse a society as ours. That task, to the extent
that it is feasible, is for the legislatures and other institutions. 77
In order to faithfully serve the competing interests at stake, the Court
held that "government actions do not violate the free exercise clause
unless they directly or indirectly operate to coerce ... individuals to
violate their religious beliefs."'' 7 1
III. THE EROSION OF FREE EXERCISE
By narrowing the scope of legally cognizable burdens on free
171. Id. at 450.
172. Id. at 450-51. The Court distinguished cases like Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), on this basis. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 450.
173. Id. at 449-50.
174. Id. at 451.
175. Id. at 467 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 452.
177. Id.
178. Note, supra note 100, at 179.
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exercise rights, Lyng quietly began to degenerate a central portion of
the constitutional bedrock underlying the free exercise clause. At the
very least, the decision manifests "a distressing [majoritarian] insensi-
tivity to Indian spiritual patterns.' 79 "A critical function of the Reli-
gion Clauses of the First Amendment is to protect the rights of
members of minority religions against quiet erosion by majoritarian
social institutions that dismiss minority beliefs and practices as unim-
portant, because unfamiliar." a0 If the erosion of free exercise occa-
sioned by Lyng may be characterized as quiet, that engendered by
Smith is nothing short of deafening.
A. Employment Division v. Smith
Alfred Smith, a sixty-six year-old Klamath Indian, was a mem-
ber of the Native American Church.' He worked as a drug coun-
selor for the Douglas County Council on Alcohol and Drug Abuse
Prevention and Treatment ("ADAPT")."8 2 According to ADAPT's
written policy, "'misuse of alcohol and/or mind-altering substances
by a staff member' is grounds for termination."'' 83 ADAPT dis-
charged Smith after he ingested peyote at a church ceremony.' 84
Peyote is classified as a controlled substance in Oregon, the possession
and use of which constitutes a felony.'85 Smith subsequently applied
for unemployment compensation benefits, which the state denied. 186
Characterizing his action as "work-related misconduct," the Employ-
ment Appeals Board found approval of Smith's application inapposite
179. Lupu, supra note 60, at 945.
180. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 524 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
181. Smith v. Employment Div., 301 Or. 209, 211, 721 P.2d 445, 446 (1986).
182. Id., 721 P.2d at 445.
183. Id., 721 P.2d at 446 (quoting ADAPT's written personnel policy).
184. Id. at 212, 721 P.2d at 446.
185. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1597 (1990).
It is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled
substance unless the substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a valid
prescription or order of a practitioner while acting in the course of his
professional practice, or except as otherwise authorized by ORS 475.005 to
475.285 and 475.991 to 475.995. Any person who violates this subsection with
respect to:
(a) A controlled substance in Schedule I, is guilty of a Class B felony.
OR. REV. STAT. § 475.992(4)(a) (Supp. 1990). A controlled substance is defined as "a drug or
its immediate precursor classified in Schedules I through V under the Federal Controlled Sub-
stances Act, 21 U.S.C., Sections 811 to 812, as modified under ORS 475.035." OR. REV.
STAT. § 475.005(6) (Supp. 1990). In Oregon, "Schedule I contains the drug peyote, a halluci-
nogen derived from the plant Lophophorawilliamsii Lemaire." Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1597 (cit-
ing OR. ADMIN. R. 855-80-021(3)(s) (1988)).
186. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1598.
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to statutory restrictions.' 7 Smith challenged the statute as violative
of his first amendment rights. 8
In Smith, 8 9 the Supreme Court held that because Oregon could
constitutionally prohibit the ingestion of peyote, the state may deny
unemployment compensation benefits to individuals discharged for
using that drug without violating the free exercise clause. 90 Setting
the opinion in terms of the Reynolds dichotomy between belief and
action, Justice Scalia stated that "the right of free exercise does not
relieve an individual of the obligation to comply" with an otherwise
valid law prohibiting conduct a state may freely regulate.' 9' He dis-
tinguished cases in which the free exercise clause barred application of
a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated conduct as
hybrid cases involving operation of "the Free Exercise Clause in con-
junction with other constitutional protections."' 92
The Court refused to review the regulation at issue under the
187. Id.; see also Smith, 301 Or. at 214-15, 721 P.2d at 448. Oregon law provided:
An individual shall be disqualified from the receipt of benefits until the individual
has performed service in employment subject to this chapter, or for an employing
unit in this or any other state or Canada or as an employe of the Federal
Government, for which renumeration is received which equals or exceeds four
times the individual's weekly benefit amount subsequent to the week in which the
act causing the disqualification occurred, if the authorized representative
designated by the assistant director finds that the individual:
(a) Has been discharged for misconduct connected with work ....
OR. REV. STAT. § 657.176(2)(a) (1987).
[M]isconduct is a wilful violation of the standards of behavior which an employer
has the right to expect of an employe. An act that amounts to a wilful disregard
of an employer's interest, or recurring negligence which demonstrates wrongful
intent is misconduct. Isolated instances of poor judgment, good faith errors, una-
voidable accidents, absences due to illness or other physical or mental disabilities,
or mere inefficiency resulting from lack of job skills or experience are not miscon-
duct for purposes of denying benefits under ORS 657.176.
OR. ADMIN. R. 471-30-038(3) (1986).
188. Smith, 301 Or. at 213, 721 P.2d at 447. Smith also relied upon his "freedom of
worship" and "freedom of religious opinion" rights as protected by the Oregon Constitution.
Id. at 212-13, 721 P.2d at 446-47. Those sections provide:
Section 2. Freedom of Worship. All men shall be secure in the Natural
right, to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own
consciences.
Section 3. Freedom of religious opinion. No law shall in any case
whatever control the free exercise, and enjoyment of religeous [sic] opinions, or
interfere with the rights of conscience.
OR. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 3.
189. The Smith case reached the Supreme Court on two separate occasions. For a
description of the procedural history of Smith, see supra notes 20-30 and accompanying text.
190. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1606.
191. Id. at 1600.
192. Id. at 1601.
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Sherbert strict scrutiny analysis.' 93 Indicating that the Court devel-
oped Sherbert "in a context that lent itself to individualized govern-
mental assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct," Justice
Scalia stated that Sherbert should not apply outside the unemploy-
ment compensation field, restricting that decision to its narrow hold-
ing. 194 He specifically excluded from Sherbert's domain free exercise
challenges involving neutral, generally applicable criminal prohibi-
tions on particular forms of conduct. 95 Such situations, he insisted,
are properly analyzed under the Reynolds standard.1 96
Justice Scalia also criticized application of the compelling gov-
ernmental interest requirement as producing, in this case, a "private
right to ignore generally applicable laws." 197 He labelled this result
"a constitutional anomaly" and asserted that application of this
requirement cannot be limited to situations involving prohibitions of
conduct central to an individual's religion.198 As the Court has often
insisted, judges should not involve themselves in deciding exactly
which practices are central to a particular religion. 199
Justice Scalia maintained that values which are protected in the
Bill of Rights are not, therefore, removed from the political pro-
cess. 0° He asserted a strong preference for political resolution of
questions involving exemptions for religiously motivated conduct
which violates generally applicable laws.2° '
[T]o say that a nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption is
permitted, or even that it is desirable, is not to say that it is consti-
tutionally required, and that the appropriate occasions for its crea-
tion can be discerned by the courts. It may fairly be said that
leaving accommodation to the political process will place at a rela-
tive disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely
engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of democratic gov-
ernment must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is
a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social importance of
193. Id. at 1603. "Almost a dozen Supreme Court cases in the last twenty-five years have
applied the test articulated in Sherbert v. Verner ...." The Supreme Court, 1989 Term-
Leading Cases, 104 HARV. L. REV. 129, 200 (1990) [hereinafter Leading Cases].
194. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1603. Stated narrowly, "Smith holds that the free exercise clause
is never violated by laws that do not regulate religious beliefs as such, are generally applicable,
implicate fewer than two constitutional rights, and punish conduct that a state has chosen to
criminalize." Leading Cases, supra note 193, at 201.
195. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1603.
196. Id. at 1602; see also supra text accompanying notes 60-61.
197. Id. at 1604.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1606.
201. Id.
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all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs.2"2
Justice O'Connor concurred in the Court's judgment, but dis-
agreed with Justice Scalia's opinion, declaring that it "dramatically
departs from well-settled First Amendment jurisprudence. ' 20 3 Not-
ing that the first amendment makes no distinction between religious
belief and conduct, she challenged the Reynolds dichotomy between
belief and action.2° Justice O'Connor argued that the free exercise
clause must at least presumptively protect religious conduct as well as
religious belief.205 For Justice O'Connor, presumptive protection can
best be guaranteed by application of a strict scrutiny standard to free
exercise challenges to governmental regulations which burden relig-
iously motivated conduct.20 6
The concurrence also challenged the Court's narrow reading of
the free exercise clause.207 Specifically, Justice O'Connor cited
Cantwell and Yoder for the proposition that the free exercise clause
may forbid the "application of a generally applicable prohibition to
religiously motivated conduct. ' 20  She asserted that those cases the
Court labelled as hybrid, including Cantwell and Yoder, expressly
based their holdings on the free exercise clause. 20 9
Justice O'Connor described relief from a governmentally
imposed burden upon religious conduct as "the essence of a free exer-
cise claim."' 210  She maintained that the political process is not an
appropriate forum in which to exclusively accommodate disfavored
religious beliefs,2"' noting that "[t]he very purpose of a Bill of Rights
was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political con-
troversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials
and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1606 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
204. Id. at 1608 (recognizing that freedom to act cannot be absolute and that a strict
scrutiny standard best respects the interests involved).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1608-09. The Sherbert test "effectuates the First Amendment's command that
religious liberty is an independent liberty, that it occupies a preferred position, and that the
Court will not permit encroachments upon this liberty, whether direct or indirect, unless
required by clear and compelling governmental interests 'of the highest order.' " Id. at 1609
(quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972)).
207. Id. at 1609; see also id. at 1600 ("We have never held that an individual's religious
beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the
State is free to regulate.").
208. Id. at 1609; see also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 303, 304-07 (1940); Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214-34 (1972).
209. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1609 (noting that the Court rejected the claims after applying a
balancing test).
210. Id. at 1610.
211. Id. at 1613.
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courts." '2 1 2 The compelling interest test, criticized by the majority,
serves to uphold the values implicit in the first amendment.213
Having established her theoretical basis, Justice O'Connor
reviewed Smith's claim through the use of the Sherbert strict scrutiny
test.2" 4 She phrased the inquiry as "whether exempting [Smith] from
the State's general criminal prohibition 'will unduly interfere with ful-
fillment of the governmental interest.' "21 Although she called the
question "close," she found that the government's compelling inter-
ests in preventing the physical harm caused by the use of the con-
trolled substance and in preventing the trafficking in such substances
justified the burden placed upon Smith's religious practice.21 6 She
insisted that granting an exemption would seriously impair fulfillment
of the state's compelling interests.21 7
The dissent, led by Justice Blackmun, characterized the Court's
opinion as "effectuat[ing] a wholesale overturning of settled law con-
cerning the Religion Clauses of our Constitution."2 8 Justice Black-
mun agreed with Justice O'Connor's theoretical stance, but differed
with the results of her analysis.21 9 Primarily, he challenged the bal-
ancing undertaken by Justice O'Connor as "distort[ing] the weighing
process in the State's favor. ' 220 He asserted that the state's interest
must be narrowed to place it in proper perspective in relation to the
individual interest at stake. 22' The state's interest involved in the bal-
ancing process, therefore, cannot be its broad interest in fighting a
"war on drugs," but its "interests in refusing to make an exception for
the religious ceremonial use of peyote.- 222
Justice Blackmum, noting that in order to be sufficiently compel-
ling to outweigh a free exercise claim, a governmental interest cannot
be merely abstract, symbolic, or speculative, characterized the state's
asserted interests, properly narrowed, as both symbolic and specula-
tive.22 3 First, Oregon could not assert an interest in faithful applica-
212. Id. (quoting West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)).
213. Id. at 1613.
214. Id. For a description of the Sherbert test, see supra note 100 and accompanying text.
215. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1614 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259 (1982)).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1616 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1617.
221. Id.; see also Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1943) ("When
it comes to weighing or valuing claims or demands with respect to other claims or demands,
we must be careful to compare them on the same plane . . . [or else] we may decide the
question in advance in our very way of putting it.").
222. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1617 (Blackmum, J., dissenting).
223. Id. at 1617-18.
1088
MAJORITARIANISM AND FREE EXERCISE
tion of its criminal prohibitions because it did not attempt to enforce
its prohibition on religious use of peyote.224 That interest, therefore,
was merely symbolic.225 Second, Oregon's asserted interests in pro-
tecting the health and safety of its citizens, in abolishing drug traffick-
ing, and in enforcement of its drug laws were speculative 226 because
the state failed to introduce evidence that the use of peyote in reli-
gious ceremonies was harmful or dangerous.227 Further, there was
"practically no illegal traffic in peyote. ' 228 Finally, Justice Blackmun
noted that the Court has consistently rejected general claims regard-
ing uniform, fair, and certain enforcement of laws.229 He dismissed
the state's fear that a flood of claims would follow from granting an
exemption for religious peyote use because that dilemma had not
arisen in states which had granted such exemptions.23°
Having specified the state's asserted interests, Justice Blackmun
concluded that those interests were not sufficiently compelling to jus-
tify the burden placed upon Smith's religious use of peyote.231 He
called attention to the federal policy, as established in the American
Indian Religious Freedom Act, of safeguarding the religious freedom
of Native Americans.232 He maintained that the Court "must scrupu-
lously apply its free exercise analysis to the religious claims of Native
Americans, however unorthodox they may be. Otherwise both the
First Amendment and the stated policy of Congress will offer the
Native Americans merely an unfulfilled and hollow promise. ' 233
B. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah
Members of the Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye practice the
224. Id. at 1617 ("Oregon has never sought to prosecute respondents, and does not claim
that it has made significant enforcement efforts against other religious users of peyote.").
225. Id.
226. Id. at 1618-21.
227. Id. at 1618.
228. Id. at 1620 ("Peyote simply is not a popular drug; its distribution for use in religious
rituals has nothing to do with the vast and violent traffic in illegal narcotics that plagues this
country. ").
229. Id.
230. Id.; see also infra note 341 (listing states that have granted exemptions).
231. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1622.
232. Id. The policy established in the American Indian Religious Freedom Act states:
[Ilt shall be the policy of the United States to protect and preserve for American
Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the
traditional religions of the American Indian, Eskimo, Aluet, and Native
Hawaiians, including but not limited to access to sites, use and possession of
sacred objects, and the freedom to worship through ceremonials and traditional
rites.
42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988).
233. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1622.
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Yoruba religion, which originated in Western Africa almost 4000
years ago and is commonly known as Santeria.234 "Herbal medicine,
prayer, protective charms, chants, magic, marriage and death rites,
and food and animal offerings are a part of this religion. ' 235  While
practiced openly in Nigeria even today, Santeria remains a stigma-
tized religion.236 As a result, "[m]ost religious activity takes place in
individual homes by extended family groups. '237
In 1987 the Church bought land in a commercial area in the City
of Hialeah in order to open a public place of worship for Santeria
practitioners.238 Shortly after the Church began preparing the land
for occupancy, the city council passed four ordinances aimed at regu-
lating animal sacrifice within city limits. 239 In response, the Church
234. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1467, 1469-70
(S.D. Fla. 1989). Yoruba came to the Western Hemisphere, primarily to the eastern region of
Cuba, with slavery during the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries. Id. at 1469.
235. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 688 F. Supp. 1522, 1524 (S.D.
Fla. 1988); see also supra note 2 and accompanying text.
236. Church of the Lukumi, 723 F. Supp. at 1469-70. The Spanish government persecuted
practitioners of the Yoruba faith in the New World. Id. at 1469. In order to escape this
persecution, and the stigma attached to the practice of a socially unaccepted religion, slaves
began to express their faith through the use of Catholic saints. Id. at 1469-70. The Santeria
religion developed from this blending of religious practices. Id. at 1470. The religion
eventually came to the United States with refugees from the Cuban revolution in the late
1950's and early 1960's. Id. "Santeria remains an underground religion and the practice was
not, and is not today, socially accepted by the majority of the Cuban population." Id. Due in
large part to the fear of discrimination, the practice of "[fthe religion has taken on a private,
personal tone that is very different than the way that it is practiced in Nigeria." Id.
237. Id. at 1470.
238. Id. at 1476.
239. Id. The first ordinance, passed as an emergency ordinance, adopted the language of
FLA. STAT. §§ 828.02-.25, the Florida anti-cruelty statute, and established penalties for its
violation. Hialeah, Fla., Ordinance 87-40 (June 9, 1987). The second ordinance prohibited
the possession of animals intended for slaughter or sacrifice. It excepted any licensed
establishments slaughtering animals for food purposes where such activity is properly zoned
and otherwise permitted by state and local law. Hialeah, Fla., Ordinance 87-52 (Sept. 8, 1987).
The third ordinance prohibited animal sacrifice within Hialeah city limits and empowered
registered groups to investigate and assist in the prosecution of individuals or groups violating
the ordinance. Hialeah, Fla., Ordinance 87-71 (Sept. 22, 1987). The fourth ordinance
prohibited the slaughter of animals on any premises within the City of Hialeah, except those
properly zoned as slaughterhouses, and empowered registered groups to investigate and assist
in the prosecution of individuals or groups violating the ordinance. Hialeah, Fla., Ordinance
87-72 (Sept. 22, 1987).
The city also passed three resolutions concerning animal sacrifice and religious practices
in general. The first resolution reiterated the City's "commitment to a prohibition against any
and all acts of any and all religious groups which are inconsistent with public morals, peace or
safety." Hialeah, Fla., Resolution 87-66 (June 9, 1987). The second resoultion established the
City's policy opposing the ritual sacrifice of animals and stated the City's intent to prosecute
any individual or organization engaging in that practice. Hialeah, Fla., Resolution 87-90
(Aug. 11, 1987). The third resolution set forth the criteria for approval of animal protection
associations seeking to register with the City in order "to participate in the investigation and
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sued the City of Hialeah, the mayor, and the city councilmen alleging
violations of its members' first, fourth, and fourteenth amendment
rights.2"
After dismissing state statutory preemption and section 1983
claims raised by the plaintiffs,24' the district court, through Judge
Spellman, addressed the Church's first amendment challenge to the
ordinances.242 The court recognized the Reynolds dichotomy by anal-
ogizing the requisite freedom of religion analysis to freedom of speech
analysis where "the manner in which the religion is conducted rather
than the beliefs of those seeking to exercise it" are at issue.243 Judge
Spellman adopted the analytical framework employed by the Elev-
enth Circuit, which provides that "[b]efore the Court balances com-
peting governmental and religious interests, the government's action
faces two threshold tests: the law must regulate conduct rather than




The court found that the city met both threshold tests. First, in
prohibiting animal sacrifice, the ordinances regulated conduct and not
belief.245 Further, the ordinances did not violate the secular purpose
test because they were not aimed at the plaintiffs, but rather they
attempted to "address the issue of animal sacrifice as a whole. ' 246
assist in the prosecution of violations of the animal cruelty ordinances." Hialeah, Fla.,
Resolution 87-109 (Sept. 22, 1987).
240. Church of the Lukumi, 688 F. Supp. at 1524. The Church sued the mayor and city
councilmen in their individual capacities for various acts, including: calling a council meeting
to discuss granting the Church a permit to use the acquired land as a place of worship,
adopting ordinances relating to the ritual sacrifice of animals, and "publicly inciting persons to
appear at a public hearing of the City Council for the purpose of presenting protests against
the Santeria religion." Id. Plaintiffs also sought to impose liability for acts of the police, the
city sanitation department, and Florida Power & Light. Id. at 1528. Finding that the mayor
and city councilmen were "entitled to absolute legislative immunity in their individual
capacities," the court held that these individuals could not be "held personally liable for
monetary damages stemming from the allegedly unconstitutional activities." Id. at 1529.
241. The court dismissed plaintiffs' argument that the city ordinances conflicted with state
animal cruelty statutes, FLA. STAT. §§ 828.02-.25, and were thus statutorily preempted.
Church of the Lukumi, 723 F. Supp. at 1479-82. Further, after addressing the free exercise
challenge to the statutory scheme, the court held that the plaintiffs failed to prove
discrimination by the City and dismissed their claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). 723 F.
Supp. at 1487-88.
242. Id. at 1482-88.
243. Id. at 1483.
244. Id. (quoting Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, 712 F.2d 729 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 827 (1984)).
245. Id.
246. Id. The City admitted that it enacted the ordinances in response to the opening of the
Church, but the court found that the announcement merely triggered the legislative response.
Id. The court indicated that the City responded instead to the plaintiff's plan to conduct
animal sacrifices. Id. Judge Spellman also stated that "[t]he ordinances do not on their face
violate the secular purpose test." Id.
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They did not violate the secular effect test because, although they did
have an impact on the Church's religious conduct, that effect was
"incidental to the ordinances' secular purpose and effect." '247 Finally,
before a balancing of the governmental and religious interests at stake,
the plaintiffs had to show that the governmental regulations imposed
a legally cognizable burden upon their religious practices.24 Noting
that animal sacrifice is an integral part of the practice of Santeria, the
court found that the ordinances did burden the plaintiffs' religious
practices and undertook the requisite balancing analysis, juxtaposing
the plaintiffs' constitutional rights and the City's asserted interests.249
The court found the three separate interests the city asserted in
support of the ordinances to be compelling. 2 0 First, the court noted
that the ordinances protected the health and safety of the public and
the members of the Church, which the religious practices threatened
due to the possible spread of disease and infestation.2"' Second, the
court found that the ordinances served to protect children from the
adverse psychological effects which may result from exposure to
animal sacrifice.2 5 2 Finally, the court acknowledged the City's inter-
est in preventing animal cruelty. 3 Judge Spellman also noted that
the City had "a compelling interest in prohibiting the slaughter or
247. Id. at 1484.
248. Id. The court stated that the "'balance depends upon the cost to the government of
altering its activity to allow the religious practice to continue unimpeded versus the cost to the
religious interest imposed by the government activity.'" Id. (quoting Grosz, 721 F.2d at 734).
The court indicated, however, that the "[p]laintiffs must identify the costs on their religious
activities imposed by the government, and these costs must be the consequence of legally
cognizable infringements on religious freedom." Id.
249. Id. at 1485-87.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 1485. Individuals sometimes find animal carcasses, along with religious
paraphernalia, in public places, generally "near rivers or canals, by four-way stop signs, under
certain palms, and sometimes in people's lawns or on doorsteps." Id. at 1474 & n.29. The
court indicated that animal remains "attract flies, rats and other animals" and that diseases
can spread between animals, and to humans. Id. at 1474-75. Judge Spellman noted that
courts have routinely upheld bans on religious conduct when that conduct posed a threat to
public health and safety. Id. at 1485. The court, however, did state that "Itihere have been no
instances documented of any infectious disease originating from the remains of animals left in
public places." Id. at 1474.
252. Id. at 1485-86. The court accepted the presence of a "correlation between the
observation of violence by children, especially when conducted by persons of perceived high
status, and the likelihood of the development of violent and aggressive behavior." Id. at 1475.
The court stated that the risk to the psychological well-being of children outweighs
countervailing religious rights. Id. at 1486.
253. Id. at 1486. In labelling the plaintiffs' method of killing as inhumane, the court noted:
Expert testimony established that the method of killing is unreliable and not
humane, and that the animals, before being sacrificed, are often kept in
conditions that produce a great deal of fear and stress in the animal. Often the
animals are kept in filthy, overcrowded conditions, and sometimes are not given
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sacrifice of animals within areas of the City not zoned for slaughter-
house use." '254
Having identified the compelling governmental interests served
by the ordinances, the court discussed the granting of a religious
exception and the standard that it must apply in making such a deter-
mination.255 "An ordinance will withstand constitutional challenge if
an exception for religious purposes will 'unduly interfere with fulfill-
ment of the governmental interest.' "256 Judge Spellman, insisting
that an "exception would, in effect, swallow the rule,1257 stated that
an exception would be unenforceable and would defeat the govern-
ment's compelling interests.2"' The court balanced the interests at
stake in the City's favor 2 9 and refused to require an exception for
religious purposes.
IV. ANALYZING SMITH AND CHURCH OF THE LUKUMI:
REASSESSING THE MAJORITARIAN PARADIGM
The decisions in Smith and Church of the Lukumi represent
interesting analytical counterparts. While both cases uphold neutral,
generally applicable laws that proscribe religious conduct, they do so
through application of markedly different methodologies. In Smith
the Court refused to apply a strict scrutiny standard in reviewing the
challenged governmental regulations, 26' but the District Court
adequate food or water. Additionally, the animals perceive both pain and fear
during the actual sacrifice ceremony.
Id.
254. Id. at 1486. The court indicated that the City's interest in prohibiting such slaughter
in residential areas and private homes was particularly strong. Id.
255. Id. at 1486-87.
256. Id. at 1486 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259 (1982)). Judge Spellman
noted that the "unduly interfere" standard is looser than a "closely tailored" or "least
restrictive means" test. Id.
257. Id. at 1487.
258. Id. The court explained that any exemption would create administrative or
enforcement problems, primarily because the practice of animal sacrifice is not limited to the
Santeria religion. Id. Enforcement agencies would experience grave difficulties in determining
responsibility for a particular sacrifice. Id. Finally, the court indicated that the plaintiffs did
not prove that their proposed alternative would satisfy the governmental interests at stake. Id.
at 1486.
259. Id. ("A balance of the compelling government interest served by the ordinances
against the burden of Plaintiffs of not being allowed to ritually sacrifice animals, with all of the
attendant risks to public health and animal welfare, must be resolved in favor of the City.").
260. Id. ("[A]ny effort to exempt purportedly religious conduct from the strictures of the
City's laws would significantly hinder the attainment of those compelling interests.").
261. The Court limited strict scrutiny review of free exercise challenges to laws of general
applicability to hybrid cases involving free exercise concerns raised in conjunction with other
constitutional protections. Employment Div. v. Smith, 110. S. Ct. 1595, 1601 (1990); see also
supra note 195 and accompanying text.
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applied that standard in Church of the Lukumi.2 62  At best, the
Supreme Court's holding in Smith signals a "cutback on the scope of
protection afforded by the First Amendment's Free Exercise
Clause. '2 63 At its worst, "Smith reduces the free-exercise clause to a
cautious redundancy. '
264
As indicated by Justice O'Connor in concurrence 265 and Justice
Blackmun in dissent,266 the downfall of Smith results from the
Court's decision to turn a blind eye to Sherbert and its progeny.267 In
so doing, the Court effectively turned the free exercise clause on its
head by emphasizing majoritarian interests in the political process
rather than individual and minority interests in liberty of conscience.
The Court's decision finds its theoretical basis in the majoritarian par-
adigm,268 which dominates constitutional law and scholarship.269
Although popular, reliance upon the majoritarian paradigm provides
little protection for constitutionally guaranteed individual rights. The
paradigm defines democracy as majority rule and establishes judicial
neutrality and deference as the benchmark principles of constitutional
jurisprudence. 270 By assuming this theoretical stance in questions of
individual autonomy and carrying it to its logical conclusion, the
Court essentially emasculates itself in an area where its passionate
participation is indispensable.271
This Section will review the majoritarian paradigm and its effect
on judicial review. Further, it will analyze Smith and Church of the
Lukumi within the walls of the paradigm and suggest the application
262. See supra notes 244-60 and accompanying text.
263. Religious Liberty Claims in Minnesota Subject to Compelling State Interest Test, 59
U.S.L.W. 1082 (Nov. 27, 1990).
264. Laycock, Watering Down the Free-Exercise Clause, 107 CHRISTIAN CENTURY, May
16-23, 1990, at 519, col. 2 (indicating that "[a]fter Smith, the free-exercise clause emphasizes
that religious speech is important to the speech clause, that religious discrimination is
important to the equal-protection clause, and that religious education is important to the
unenumerated right of parents to direct their children's education").
265. See supra notes 207-13 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 218 & 233 and accompanying text.
267. See Minnesota v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. 1990) (stating that the
Smith holding "apparently does away with the traditional compelling state interest test for
laws burdening the exercise of religion standing alone").
268. Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Foreword: The Vanishing
Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 61 n.77 (1989) (defining the majoritarian paradigm as
"the philosophy ... that American democracy means majority rule; that the legislatures and
executives are majoritarian; but the Court is counter-majoritarian and that as a result, the
Court should invalidate government actions only when they violate clear constitutional
principles that exist apart from the preferences of the Justices").
269. Id. at 61.
270. Id. at 64-65.
271. Id. at 57 ("one obvious consequence of the [majoritarian] jurisprudence is that the
government generally wins constitutional cases").
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of a strengthened standard of review in free exercise challenges-a
standard which will operate within the boundaries of the paradigm.
A. The Evolution of the Majoritarian Paradigm
Various legal scholars have characterized the nature of judicial
review as anti-democratic.272 "The power of judges to decide impor-
tant questions of public policy seems to run counter to the democratic
ideal that reserves such decisions to democratically elected represent-
atives, either in the legislative or the executive branches of the govern-
ment."273 Two historical forces, "the demise of natural rights theory
in constitutional decisionmaking and a shift in the concept of democ-
racy," have served as the catalysts for the widespread adoption of a
theory which views judicial review through majoritarian lenses.274
The framers of the United States Constitution "believed that*
individuals possess natural rights"-rights that existed before, and
were embedded in, the Constitution.2 " Recognition of the existence
of such rights impliedly limited the constitutional scope of legislative
enactments.276 Consequently, the Supreme Court expressed minimal
concern over the "nature of judicial review. ' 27 7 Eventually, however,
natural rights jurisprudence yielded to the theory of legal realism.278
The judiciary and legal scholars came to view rights previously
labelled "natural," as mere value choices more properly adopted in a
majoritarian fashion.279
Through their writings, the framers also evinced a "considerable
distrust of democracy and majoritarianism" 28 ° and designed the gov-
ernment accordingly. 28' "Under the original Constitution, the Presi-
272. Id. at 62 (citing Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893); Horowitz, Republicanism and Liberalism in
American Constitutional Thought, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57 (1987)).
273. Redlich, Judges As Instruments of Democracy, in THE ROLE OF COURTS IN SOCIETY
149 (S. Shetreet ed. 1988); see also Graglia, "Constitutional Theory": The Attempted
Justification for the Supreme Court's Liberal Political Program, 65 TEX. L. REV. 789, 798
(1987) ("Plato undertook to defend government by philosopher-kings. Our system of
government by lawyer-kings in judicial robes, however, is openly defended by no one. It is in
fact indefensible in the American context, in which notions of local autonomy and government
by the consent of the governed retain strong appeal.").
274. Chemerinsky, supra note 268, at 64-65.
275. Id. at 65.
276. Id. at 65-66.
277. Id. at 66.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 89.
280. Komesar, A Job for the Judges: The Judiciary and the Constitution in a Massive and
Complex Society, 86 MICH. L. REV. 657, 661 (1988) (noting that "[t]he terms of the
Constitution and the writings surrounding its framing reveal" this distrust).
281. Chemerinsky, supra note 268, at 65.
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dent was chosen by the electoral college, the Senate was comprised of
two Senators elected by each state legislature, and the federal judici-
ary was selected by the President, was approved by the Senate, and
was assured life tenure." '282 Over time, however, popular conceptions
of American democracy, which defined the system by majority rule,
faded and were replaced by a pluralistic conception of the system,
which established majoritarianism as "an end in itself. '283 Under this
definition, institutional decisions lacking a majoritarian flavor are
undemocratic.284 Judicial invalidation of legislation enacted by the
more representative branches, when coupled with the belief that no
true values exist, compels the conclusion that "judicial review is noth-
ing but the substitution by unelected judges of their values for those of
the popularly elected legislatures."285
B. Strict Scrutiny: A Product of the Paradigm
Within the majoritarian framework, jurists and scholars have
developed various methods by which to define the judicial role and
286Amotclbaeassess the proper scope of judicial review. A most celebrated
method traces its origin to Justice Stone's famous footnote four in
Carolene Products,28 7 the birthplace of strict scrutiny review.
288
The method espoused by the footnote "offered a way to define the
judicial role that seemed consistent with a commitment to
majoritarian democracy."28 9  The theory underlying the method
generally addresses the dual concerns animating current constitu-
282. Id.
283. Id. at 67.
284. See Sadurski, Judicial Protection of Minorities: The Lessons of Footnote Four, 17
ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 163, 165 (1988) ("[I]f open-ended clauses of the constitution require
substantive value judgments, why should the nine unelected, unrepresentative and life-tenured
lawyers be entrusted with the right to replace the value judgments of the duly elected
representatives of the people?"). As Judge Gibbons notes:
For [those who criticize judicial review as inconsistent with democrary],
democracy is not seen as an unfolding historical reality, to be understood at each
point in its evolution, but as an eternal absolute defined in terms of majority will.
This abstract and pure conception is seen as a value to be upheld at all costs in all
circumstances. The object of all government, for such purists, is the attainment
of that value in preference to any other. That being the case, any
instrumentalities of government that frustrate the attainment of that value must
be suspect, if not downright evil.
Gibbons, Keynote Address, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 260, 260 (1981).
285. Chemerinsky, supra note 268, at 68.
286. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); R. BERGER,
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
287. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4; see also Powell, supra note 98, at 1089. For
the text of the footnote, see supra note 6.
288. See supra note 98.
289: Chemerinsky, supra note 268, at 68.
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tional jurisprudence: the demise of natural law and judicial
countermajoritarianism.2 90
The theory holds that "[o]ur democracy rests on the fundamen-
tal proposition that governmental actions derive their legitimacy from
the consent of the governed or, more specifically, from the consent of
a majority of those governed." 291 Various groups, however, cannot
participate effectively in the political process and, therefore, the pro-
cess cannot be trusted to ensure their protection.292 Thus, the judici-
ary must function in a countermajoritarian2 93 fashion in protecting
the individual rights of members of those groups.294 The judiciary's
function in this capacity serves to ameliorate the dysfunctional results
of the otherwise legitimate majoritarian system.295 Accordingly, the
judiciary
has two special missions in our scheme of government:
First, to clear away impediments to participation, and ensure
that all groups can engage equally in the political process; and
Second, to review with heightened scrutiny legislation inimi-
cal to discrete and insular minorities who are unable to protect
290. See supra notes 272-85 and accompanying text. The Carolene Products method
addresses "natural law" concerns by noting that judicial review corrects defects in the process
through which the legislature makes its substantive judgments, not the judgments themselves.
Sadurski, supra note 284, at 166. The Carolene Products method addresses judicial
countermajoritarianism concerns by indicating that judicial review serves as a check upon the
functioning of the majoritarian system. Id. "(T]he only statutes which can be truly legitimate
are those which are the product of a genuine majority will and where no group is ignored
merely because it lacks adequate access to democratic decision-making." Id. (emphasis in
original).
291. Conkle, The Legitimacy of Judicial Review in Individual Rights Cases: Michael Perry's
Constitutional Theory and Beyond, 69 MINN. L. REV. 587, 589 (1985); see also Powell, supra
note 98, at 1088-89 ("Our constitution assumes that majorities should rule and that the
government should be able to govern. Therefore, for the most part, Congress and the state
legislatures should be allowed to do as they choose.").
292. Powell, supra note 98, at 1089. These are the groups Justice Stone labelled "discrete
and insular minorities." United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
293. While courts are generally viewed as acting in a countermajoritarian capacity in this
area, some scholars differ sharply from this position.
Judges are part of the democratic dialogue. They are not alien counter-
majoritarians roaming over the majoritarian political landscape. They are not
removed from democracy but are an essential component of it, and in many
instances more representative of the popular will than the other branches. All
are partners in the common endeavor of representative government.
Redlich, supra note 273, at 156.
294. Id.; see also Conkle, supra note 291, at 590 ("For the Court to recognize constitutional
rights is for it to annul the challenged legislative or executive actions, actions taken, at least
presumptively, with majoritarian consent.").
295. Chemerinsky, supra note 268, at 68 ("The judiciary's task was to facilitate effective
democratic decisionmaking by ensuring full participation and preventing incumbents from
frustrating electoral accountability."); see also Sadurski, supra note 284, at 166.
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themselves in the legislative process.29 6
Viewed in this light, "[t]he Carolene Products philosophy of judicial
review accept[s] the premises that democracy means majority rule and
that a democratic society cannot accept value imposition by
judges. 297
C. Majoritarianism and Strict Scrutiny
The Supreme Court seems increasingly committed to operating
primarily within an institutional framework erected upon a
majoritarian substructure.298 While searching for an objective wall
upon which to hang the Constitution, the Court has, in a sense,
repainted the canvas by framing its language in a way that excludes
the moral inspiration that served as the impetus for its creation.
"Without judicial enforcement, the Constitution is little more than
the parchment that sits under the glass in the National Archives. '299
After Smith, however, responsibility for the protection of minority
interests, at least in the area of freedom of religious conduct, falls, not
upon the judiciary, but upon the "majoritarian" 3° institutions which
failed the minority in the first place.30 1 Even in a society grounded
upon a majoritarian definition of democracy, such an institutional
posture is, if anything, absurd.
1. THE NEED FOR STRICT SCRUTINY REVIEW
Lawyers have a responsibility to point out the very basic fact
that, in determining whether an individual has a right to express
him- or herself in a particular way, what the majority thinks about
such expression is largely irrelevant. That is the essential heart of
296. Powell, supra note 98, at 1089. Justice Powell indicated that he did not "embrace this
theory one hundred percent" but neither did he condemn it. Id.
297. Chemerinsky, supra note 268, at 69.
298. Id. at 61-62; see also Texas v. Johnson, 110 S. Ct. 2533, 2555 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
Surely one of the high purposes of a democratic society is to legislate against
conduct that is regarded as evil and profoundly offensive to the majority of
people-whether it be murder, embezzlement, pollution, or flag burning.
Our Constitution wisely places limits on powers of legislative majorities to
act, but the declaration of such limits by this Court "is, at all times, a question of
much delicacy, which ought seldom, if ever, to be decided in the affirmative, in a
doubtful case."
Id. (citation omitted).
299. Id. at 97.
300. For interesting discussions concerning the characterization of the politically
accountable branches as "majoritarian," see id. at 77-83, and Choper, The Supreme Court and
the Political Branches: Democratic Theory and Practice, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 810 (1974).
301. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1606 (1990).
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the Bill of Rights-protection against government acting not on its
own initiative but at the behest of a tyrannical majority.3" 2
It is "[p]recisely because the Court is not a majoritarian institu-
tion [that] it has a constitutional responsibility to carefully scrutinize
majority-passed legislation that directly impinges upon the exercise of
.. . rights by minorities. ' 30 3 Although the Smith Court correctly
noted that values protected in the Bill of Rights are not thereby
removed from the political process, a° the Court failed to recognize
that these values should not be resigned solely to that process. "The
objective of bills of rights is to give special protection for rights which
are felt to be of fundamental importance. 30 5  The judicial branch
must be entrusted with the duty of providing special protection where
fundamental rights are at stake. Within a majoritarian framework
such protection can only come from strict scrutiny review.
The Court dismissed this duty in Smith by focusing on the neu-
tral, generally applicable nature of the regulations involved. 306 There
is, however, nothing talismanic about neutral, generally applicable
laws. 30 7 "[L]aws neutral toward religion can coerce a person to vio-
late his religious conscience or intrude upon his religious duties just as
effectively as laws aimed at religion. ' 30 8 The danger may be greater
because "no legislature would be naive enough openly to suppress a
religious group without using a facially neutral gerrymander. 30 9
The Court recognized that its holding placed unpopular religious
practices at a relative disadvantage, but dismissed this result as an
"unavoidable consequence" of democracy.310 The Court's justifica-
tion for this position stemmed from its fear that a contrary holding
would allow each conscience to become a "law unto itself,'311
although there is no guarantee that the Court's holding prevents such
302. Simeonidis, The Last Word on Freedom, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 18, 1991, at 14, col. 2.
303. C. DUCAT & H. CHASE, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 67 (4th ed. 1988). That
a law indirectly impinges upon those rights does not alter this responsibility because a
"regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional
requirement." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972).
304. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1606.
305. Rumble, James Madison on the Value of Bills of Rights, in NoMoS Xx:
CONSTITUTIONALISM 122, 124 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1979). "One's right to life,
liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other
fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no
elections." West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
306. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1602-04.
307. Id. at 1612 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
308. Id.
309. Laycock, supra note 264, at 519, col. 2.
310. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1606.
311. Id.
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a result. An individual may just as likely obey either the laws of his
god or the laws of society when these two conflict. The free exercise
clause must be read to eliminate, as far as possible, the emergence of
such a conflict.
Strict scrutiny review, though not perfect,3" 2 is the best way to
effectuate such a reading of the clause. The standard inquires into the
goals of legislative enactments and the means pursued in achieving
those goals. When applicable, it requires that the goals of the chal-
lenged regulation be substantially important or compelling and then
requires that the means employed to attain those goals be those least
restrictive of the individual interest at stake.31 3 The standard thus
forces the government to justify any infringement upon individual
interests deemed worthy of this level of protection. As such, it pro-
motes sensitivity to minority interests in the legislative process, as
well as creative legislative methods. The alternative standard,
adopted in Smith, allows the "criminal punishment of the central reli-
gious ritual of an ancient faith" ' 4 without requiring any justification.
This resurrection of Reynolds marked not only the entombment of
Sherbert, but of free "exercise" as well.
Although the Smith Court required no governmental justification
for the religious burden imposed by the Oregon law prohibiting cere-
monial use of peyote, a1 5 the district court forced the City of Hialeah
to justify the ordinances restricting animal sacrifice in Church of the
Lukumi.3 16 Examining the differences between the two cases provides
stark evidence of the protections afforded by strict scrutiny review.
Characterizing the Hialeah ordinances as neutral both in purpose and
effect, Judge Spellman nonetheless found a legally cognizable burden
upon the free exercise rights of members of the Santeria religion.3 7
Because the regulations burdened a fundamental right, the court
undertook a strict scrutiny analysis.18 In order to justify the burden
imposed by the ordinances, the city advanced three interests: animal
welfare, public health, and protection of children.3"9 The court found
these interests compelling, found any exception unenforceable, and,
after balancing the governmental interests against the burdened right,
312. See Laycock, supra note 264, at 518, col. 2.
313. See supra note 98.
314. Laycock, supra note 264, at 518, col. 1.
315. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1608 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
316. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1467, 1483-87
(S.D. Fla. 1989).
317. Id. at 1484-85.
318. Id. at 1484-87.
319. Id. at 1485.
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found that the former outweighed the latter.32° While the result in
both cases was the same, the analytical methods employed by each
court demonstrate the vast difference between the two modes of anal-
ysis and the critical need for judicial review of all laws which cogniza-
bly burden fundamental rights.
2. A HEIGHTENED STRICT SCRUTINY
Courts must faithfully apply an exacting strict scrutiny standard
when reviewing claims based on infringement of free exercise rights
through governmental regulation of religious conduct. Cases arising
under the free exercise clause require courts to determine when the
legitimate claims of government or society must prevail over the con-
stitutional rights of individuals. 321 "For religious minorities, what is
at stake is often the ability to obey their conscience, sometimes on
issues they believe essential to salvation. 31 2 2 The Sherbert test, while
necessary to the maintenance of adequate protection for free exercise
rights and the proper resolution of the clash of competing interests, is
nonetheless incomplete.
While protecting individual freedom to a great degree, strict
scrutiny analysis generally assumes that a governmental interest iden-
tified as compelling is superior to the individual rights it burdens. 23
Consequently, strict scrutiny analysis becomes overly deferential to
compelling governmental interests, while at the same time, it fails to
provide the utmost protection to the individual freedoms enshrined in
the first amendment.
In order to serve these competing concerns more properly, courts
must create a new balance between compelling governmental interests
and first amendment rights. While recognizing the importance of
governmental interests, this balance should strive to weigh these inter-
ests on a scale which properly juxtaposes the significant value of the
burdened individual freedoms. This balance should redefine the
boundary between these competing concerns. The boundary, while
not absolute, as no boundary in this area can or should be, will respect
both concerns. It will, however, favor the values constitutionally rec-
ognized as fundamental. The balance, therefore, presupposes the con-
stitutional necessity of granting exemptions for religious conduct
when that conduct violates a law of general applicability. In order to
320. Id. at 1486-87.
321. Marcus, supra note 6, at 1231.
322. Laycock, supra note 264, at 519, col. 1.
323. See Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential But Unanalyzed Term
in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U.L. REV. 917, 922 (1988).
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assure individuals the greatest degree of religious freedom, it places
the burden upon the government in all appropriate circumstances.
A heightened strict scrutiny analysis would involve application
of a four-part test. As a whole, the test would entail the use of a post-
Lee strict scrutiny analysis followed by a balancing test.324 The bal-
ancing test corrects the noted defect of strict scrutiny-the standard's
natural deference toward governmental interests identified as compel-
ling.3 25 While there are dangers in judicial balancing that affect free
exercise rights,326
most constitutional jurisprudence involves some overt or covert
comparison between individual rights and governmental interests.
A principled inquiry into the legitimacy and significance of inter-
ests is essential to distinguish-in any formulation requiring a
comparison between rights and interests-those cases in which
interests prevail from those in which rights prevail. Absolute solu-
tions are obviously impossible. 27
The final step in the process requires application of the "unduly
interfere" standard as espoused in United States v. Lee.32 This step
should only apply to those cases where the governmental interest is
compelling and outweighs the burdened constitutional right. In such
cases, the court should allow an exemption only where it would not
unduly interfere with the governmental interest. Where the constitu-
tional right outweighs the compelling governmental interest, however,
the court should require an exemption, and the Lee test need not be
applied, regardless of the resulting infringement on the governmental
interest. In sum, the four-part test is as follows:
1. Does the governmental regulation at issue burden an individ-
ual's free exercise of religious conduct?
2. Does the regulation at issue pursue a compelling governmen-
tal interest?
3. Does the compelling governmental interest outweigh the con-
stitutionally protected right with which it conflicts?
,4. Would granting an exemption for the burdened religious con-
duct unduly interfere with fulfillment of the compelling interest
pursued by the governmental regulation at issue?
324. See Marcus, supra note 6, at 1245-47.
325. Id. at 1245.
326. The added step might render free exercise standards less predicatable. Moreover, these
kinds of cases "do not lend themselves to the relatively unyielding contours of definitional
balancing." Id. at 1245-46.
327. Gottlieb, supra note 323, at 924.
328. 455 U.S. 252, 259 (1982).
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3. REVISITING SMITH AND CHURCH OF THE LUKUMI
To recognize or create standards "is hardly to appreciate" their
true impact. 329 Application of the proposed standard to Smith and
Church of the Lukumi produces an interesting result. The govern-
mental regulations fail the test in one instance, but not in the other.
Application of the standard, therefore, highlights one border dividing
permissible and impermissible governmental intrusions upon the lib-
erty of conscience in matters of religion. This border is based upon
the internal and external effects of the religious practice at issue.33°
Activities such as the ceremonial consumption of peyote, whose
effects are entirely internalized within the ceremony and are of the
sort which the state has no real interest in preventing,33 1 may not be
restricted--even by laws of general applicability. Activities, such as
the ritual sacrifice of animals, which contain both external and inter-
nal effects which the state has an interest in preventing, may be
restricted.
Because of the coercive nature of the regulations at issue in
Smith and Church of the Lukumi, both meet the first prong of the test
as adopted in Lyng. 332 This Section will therefore only discuss the
application of the final three prongs of the proposed standard.
a. The Ceremonial Consumption of Peyote
"To forbid the use of peyote is to remove the theological heart of
Peyotism.
333
The governmental regulation at issue in Smith fails to meet the
329. See Marcus, supra note 6, at 1247.
330. See MILL, supra note 1, at 21-22.
[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection.
That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.
Id.
331. Examples of ceremonies containing only internalized effects that the state has an
interest in preventing include ceremonies involving animal sacrifice without more, ceremonies
involving human sacrifice where the sacrificed individual is a willing participant (if any exist),
and ceremonies involving illegal drug consumption where the drug is proven to be dangerous
or of the kind in which illegal trafficking exists.
332. See supra notes 167-78 and accompanying text. Both the unemployment
compensation laws in Smith, which indirectly implicated the criminal prohibition against
possession or consumption of peyote, and the ordinances outlawing animal sacrifice in Church
of the Lukumi, coerce individuals, either directly or indirectly, to violate their religious beliefs.
333. People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 722, 394 P.2d 813, 818, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 74 (1964).
In Woody, the California Supreme Court held that a state law criminalizing possession and use
of peyote violated the free exercise rights of members of the Native American Church. Id. at
720, 394 P.2d at 816, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 72.
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proposed standard at any of the three remaining stages. Oregon's
interest in restricting the ceremonial consumption of peyote does not
qualify as compelling. Oregon presented no evidence establishing any
physical harm from peyote use.334 In fact, considerable evidence
refutes the existence of any such harm. 3 Sacramental use of peyote,
as undertaken by members of the Native American Church, poses no
threat of harm to those who do not use the drug.336 Certain institu-
tionalized safeguards employed in ceremonies of the Church assure
that the effects of the drug subside before these ceremonies end. 3 7
The state's only arguably compelling interest involves the pre-
vention of illegal trafficking of peyote. "There is, however, practically
no illegal traffic in peyote. 3 38  In addition, because peyote consump-
tion is an unpleasant experience, use of the drug is self-limiting.3 9
Even if the state's interest in restricting peyote use was compelling,
and that interest outweighed the individual interest in the free exer-
cise of religion, the granting of a religious exemption for peyote use
would not unduly interfere with fulfillment of the governmental inter-
est. The minimal illegal traffic in peyote and the internal regulations
of the Native American Church "adequately protect against nonreli-
gious peyote distribution. ' 340 Furthermore, twenty-three states and
334. Id., at 1618 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In fact, "the State never asserted this health
and safety interest before the Oregon courts ...." Id. at 1618 n.4.
335. Id. at 1618-19 (noting acceptance of the apparent safety of peyote among experts and
courts); see also Bergman, Navajo Peyote Use: Its Apparent Safety, 128 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
695 (1971) (describing the general lack of harmful effects of peyote consumption as undertaken
by members of the Native American Church); Leading Cases, supra note 193, at 207
(discussing "[t]he complete lack of evidence establishing any physical harm from peyote use
and the abundant data refuting the existence of such harm").
336. See Leading Cases, supra note 193, at 207-08.
337. See Bergman, supra note 335, at 698. The formal part of a peyote ceremony "begins at
sunset and ends at sunrise." Id. at 696. Custom dictates that no one leave a meeting early. Id.
at 698. Further, participants make considerable efforts to prevent those who consumed peyote
"from going off alone into the night." Id. Finally, a customary activity, which occurs on the
morning following the meeting, is socializing until well after the effect of the drug has passed.
Id.
338. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1620 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see Olsen v. DEA, 878 F.2d 1458,
1463, 1467 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (nationwide DEA peyote seizures between 1980 and 1987
amounted to 19.4 pounds whereas such seizures for marijuana amounted to over 15 million
pounds).
339. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1619 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "[T]he eating of peyote usually is
a difficult ordeal in that nausea and other unpleasant physical manifestations occur regularly.
Repeated use is likely, therefore, only if one is a serious researcher or is devoutly involved in
taking peyote as part of a religious ceremony." Id. (quoting E. ANDERSON, PEYOTE: THE
DIVINE CACTUS 161 (1980)).
340. Leading Cases, supra note 193, at 207 (citing Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1618-19 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting)); see also Olsen, 878 F.2d at 1464 ("for members of the Native American
Church, use of peyote outside the ritual is sacrilegious"); Slotkin, The Peyote Way, in
TEACHINGS FROM THE AMERICAN FAITH 96, 104 (D. Tedlock & B. Tedlock eds. 1975)
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the federal government have created exemptions from their drug laws
for the ceremonial use of peyote. 41 In addition, "the availability of
peyote for religious use, even if Oregon were to allow an exemption,
... would still be strictly controlled by federal regulations ... and by
the state of Texas, the only state in which peyote grows in significant
quantities. '3 42  These combined factors mandate a constitutional
exemption from drug laws of general applicability which burden the
free exercise rights of Native Americans that consume peyote in reli-
gious ceremonies.
b. The Ritual Sacrifice of Animals
To forbid animal sacrifice is to remove the theological heart of
Santeria.
The governmental regulations at issue in Church of the Lukumi
survive all three of the remaining prongs of the proposed test. First,
the government established three compelling interests as justification
for the enactment of ordinances restricting the ritual slaughter of ani-
mals: prevention of animal cruelty,343 the welfare and safety of the
community, 344 and the protection of children. 345  Second, the scale
(indicating that the Native American Church "vigorously opposes the sale or use of Peyote for
non-sacramental purposes").
341. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1618 n.5. The federal government exempts religious peyote use
from its drug laws. See 21 CFR § 1307.31 (1990). At least 23 states provide similar
exemptions for religious peyote use, either expressly or by reference to the federal exemption.
See ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.195 (1989); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3402(B) (1989); COLO.
REV STAT. § 12-22-317(3) (1990); IOWA CODE ANN. § 204.204.8 (West 1987); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 65-4116(c)(8) (Supp. 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 152-02, subd. 2(4) (West 1989);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-29-11 l(d) (1981); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-32-203 (1987); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 453.541 (1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:21-3(c) (West Supp. 1990); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 30-31-6(D) (Supp. 1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-88(d) (1985); N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-
02.4 (Supp. 1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28-2.01(c) (1989); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-
20B-14(17) (Supp. 1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-403(d) (Supp. 1990); TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.11 l(a) (Vernon 1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-3(3) (1990); VA.
CODE ANN. § 54.1-3443(D) (1988); WASH. REV. CODE § 69-50.201(d) (Supp. 1991); W. VA.
CODE § 60A-2-201(d) (1989); Wis. STAT. § 161.115 (1989); WYO. STAT. § 35-7-1044 (1988).
342. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1620 (citations omitted).
343. Florida has recognized that laws aimed at protecting animals from harassment and ill-
treatment are valid exercises of police power. Church of the Lukumi, 723 F. Supp. at 1486
(citing C.E. America, Inc. v. Antinori, 210 So. 2d 443, 444 (Fla. 1968)). The Court noted that
the method employed by members of the Church is both "unreliable and not humane." Id.
344. The government may regulate conduct which poses a clear danger to the health of the
public. Id.; see also State ex rel. Swann v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99, 109 (Tenn. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 954 (1976) (upholding bans on ritual snake handling). The practices of the Church
expose both its members and the public to possible disease and infestation. Church of the
Lukumi, 723 F. Supp. at 1485. The government has an indisputably compelling interest in
controlling disease. Id.
345. Church of the Lukumi, 723 F. Supp. at 1485. "[E]xposure to the ritual sacrifice of
animals imperils the psychological well-being of children and increases the likelihood that a
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incorporated in the next prong of the test, by which the competing
individual and governmental interests at stake are balanced, tips in
favor of the governmental interests.346 Finally, granting an exemption
for the ritual sacrifice of animals would unduly interfere with fulfill-
ment of the compelling governmental interests. 47 Having satisfied all
the requirements of the proposed test, the government would not be
constitutionally required to grant an exemption for the ritual sacrifice
of animals.
V. CONCLUSION: FREE EXERCISE AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS
In a mass society, which presses at every point toward conformity,
the protection of a self-expression, however unique, of the individ-
ual and the group becomes ever more important. The varying cur-
rents of the subcultures that flow into the mainstream of our
national life give it depth and beauty. We preserve a greater value
than an ancient tradition when we protect the rights of [individuals
and groups to practice their religions freely].348
"[I1n pluralistic societies such as ours, institutions dominated by
a majority are inevitably, if inadvertently, insensitive to the needs and
values of minorities when these needs and values differ from those of
the majority. 3 49 The Sherbert standard, while not perfect, "was criti-
cal to the religious liberty of small faiths." 5 0  It ensured
countermajoritarian involvement, and thus protection, in concerns of
fundamental significance to individuals---concerns that should not be
resigned to the insensitive realm of the political process.
In our constitutional landscape, the first amendment stands as a
barrier, protecting the firm ground of individual freedom in matters of
conscience from the rising sea of majoritarian insensitivity. Courts
child will become more aggressive and violent." Id. at 1486. The Supreme Court has held that
this interest outweighs any countervailing religious interests. Id. (citing Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hospital, 278 F.
Supp. 488, 504-05 (W.D.N.D. Wash. 1967), aff'd, 390 U.S. 598 (1968)).
346. The effects of the religious practice at issue are both external and internal. While the
free exercise of religion is a preferred constitutional activity, that individual right cannot be
preferred to the protection of the health, safety, and welfare of the public, a governmental
interest of the first magnitude.
347. Church of the Lukumi, 723 F. Supp. at 1486-87. Any exemption would simply be
unenforceable, would not satisfy the governmental concerns, and "would, in effect, swallow
the rule." Id. A primary problem in this regard is the fact that the Church sought, for its
members, the right to perform animal sacrifices in their own homes. Id. at 1469. When
coupled with the fact that Santeria is basically an underground religion, this additional right
makes any exemption unenforceable. Id. at 1487 n.59.
348. People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 727, 394 P.2d 813, 821-22, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 77-78
(1964).
349. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 523-24 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
350. Laycock, supra note 264, at 518, col. 2.
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must proceed cautiously in any endeavor which may reshape or erode
this protective wall lest we all be engulfed by the wave of intolerance
to follow. Within the dominant majoritarian framework, a strength-
ened strict scrutiny standard constitutes the next step in protecting
religious freedoms from such an ominous fate. Unfortunately, after
the Supreme Court's step backwards in Smith, questions involving the
free exercise of various religious rituals implicate not the first amend-
ment,351 but the political process-and Babalu Aye is not pleased.
ROBERTO A. TORRICELLA, JR.
351. Id. at 518, col. 1.
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